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PAYING FOR LAW SCHOOL:
LAW STUDENT LOAN INDEBTEDNESS AND CAREER
CHOICES
Christopher J. Ryan, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Student loan debt has reached crisis levels. The current outstanding
student loan debt is roughly $1.64 trillion dollars and continues to grow every
year.1 As of 2019, student loan debt is the second largest source of debt for
US citizens, surpassing credit card debt and topped only by home mortgage
debt.2 While only 5 percent of that debt is owed by law students and law
school graduates, law school loan debt exceeds $7 billion.3 This should not

*

Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University
School of Law; Affiliated Scholar, American Bar Foundation. Ph.D., Vanderbilt University;
J.D., University of Kentucky; M.Ed., University of Notre Dame; A.B. Dartmouth College. I
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Profession, whose engagement and opportunity to present this research were sincerely
welcomed. Finally, I would like to thank Blaine Payer and Sophia Weaver, whose diligent
research assistance immeasurably benefitted me in writing this Article.
1
See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Student Loans a Lot Like the Mortgage Debacle, Says
Watchdog, NPR (December 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/09/785527874/studentloans-a-lot-like-the-subprime-mortgage-debacle-watchdog-says; and Anya Kamenetz,
Democratic Presidential Contenders Propose Free College And Student Loan Forgiveness,
NPR (June 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/736342686/democratic-presidentialcontenders-propose-free-college-and-student-loan-forgive.
2

See, e.g., Zack Friedman, Are Student Loans the Next Mortgage Crisis?, FORBES
(December 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/12/11/are-studentloans-the-next-mortgage-crisis/#2ddd5a333f86; and Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt
Statistics In 2019: A $1.5 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (February 25, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/02/25/student-loan-debt-statistics2019/#14507d9f133f.
3
For perspective, $7 billion is roughly 10 percent of the United States Department of
Education’s entire 2019 discretionary budget. See Department of Education Fiscal Year
2020, Discretionary Action, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (October 16, 2019),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget20/20action.pdf; and What Trump
Proposed Cutting in His 2019 Budget, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2018),

2

PAYING FOR LAW SCHOOL

[29-JAN-20]

be surprising to anyone, and least of all to current law students or recent law
school graduates. Legal education is a costly proposition for most law
students, an estimated 83 percent of whom have incurred or will incur debt
to attend law school.4 The average cost of tuition and fees at private law
schools was $49,095 and $40,725 at public law schools, for out-of-state
students, in the 2018-2019 academic year, to say nothing of living expenses
and other costs that students encounter.5 As a result, many law school
graduates carry significant student loan debt. In fact, the average amount
borrowed by law school graduates who took out loans to attend law school
totaled $115,481 in 2018,6 which does not include existing debt from
previous student loans these borrowers secured to attend their baccalaureate
institutions.
When discussing student loan debt, it is easy to fixate on the aggregate
impact of the burdens this debt places on taxpayers, the economy, and
borrowers alike, such as the depressive effects that student loan debt has on
marriage, homeownership, and entrepreneurship.7 Yet, a discussion of which
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/politics/trump-budget-2019/ (noting that
the entire budget for the Department of Education is $63.2 billion).
4
Aaron N. Taylor, The Marginalization of Black Aspiring Attorneys, 13 F.I.U. L. REV.
489, 506 (2019) (citing LSSSE data). See, e.g., THE LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT
ENGAGEMENT, HOW A DECADE OF DEBT CHANGED THE LAW STUDENT EXPERIENCE: 2015
ANNUAL
SURVEY
RESULTS
10
(2016)
https://lssse.indiana.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-Annual-Report-2015-Update-FINAL-revised-web.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Ilana Kowarski, See the Price, Payoff of Law School before Enrolling, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 12, 2019, https://www.usnews.com/education/bestgraduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/law-school-cost-starting-salary. The total cost of
attendance may be nearly double the cost of tuition and fees, exceeding $100,000 at elite
private law schools like the University of Chicago and Columbia University. See, e.g., Cost
OF
CHICAGO
LAW
SCHOOL,
available
at:
of
Attendance,
UNIV.
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/financialaid/budget; and Tuition, Fees, and Living Expenses
Budget,
COLUMBIA
LAW
SCHOOL,
available
at:
https://www.law.columbia.edu/admissions/graduate-legal-studies/tuition-fees-andfinancial-aid. One hidden cost to attending law school is the price of purchasing casebooks,
which can carry price tags between $200 and $300 per class, costing students an additional
$4,000 or more over the course of their three years in law school. See, e.g., Ben Trachtenberg,
Choosing a Criminal Procedure Casebook: On Lesser Evils and Free Books, 60 ST. LOUIS
U. L. REV. 543 (2016); and Kyle McEntee, Law Books for the Price of Printing?, ABOVE
THE LAW (June 30, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/06/law-books-for-the-price-ofprinting/?rf=1.
6
Law
School
Costs
Debt,
LAW
SCHOOL
TRANSPARENCY,
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/debt/.
7
See, e.g., Clifford Robb & Samantha L. Schreiber, Married with Children? The Role
of
Student
Debt,
SSRN
Working
Paper
(October
4,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3458547&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_
social:sciences:education:ejournal_abstractlink (noting that, for four-year college graduates,
a $1,000 increase in cumulative undergraduate student loan balance was associated with a
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graduates are saddled with the largest student loans and how their debt
obligations impacts their career choices is often absent from conversations
about student debt and has been understudied to date. In fact, while a handful
of studies have investigated the relationship between a law student’s debt
obligations and the career path they ultimately choose, none have examined
this issue outside of the walls of one law school or another.8 This Article
contributes to the discourse about student loan debt and its potentially
negative externalities by investigating responses from an original survey
administered at four law schools, revealing critical findings about law
students’ expected debt loads, career choices, and intentions to participate in
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.
In Part I of this Article, the student loan crisis is more closely examined
with particular emphasis on its salience for law school graduates. In addition,
the first part of this Article provides credible descriptive evidence that rates
and amounts of borrowing to attend law school impact law students
differentially on the basis of their endowed characteristics, such as race and
parental education. Next, Part II explores the Public Service Loan
Forgiveness program, describing the program’s creation and implementation,
in addition to evaluating its efficacy and the direct and indirect costs of its
administration. Part III discusses two pervasive issues within the legal
academy with significant social implications—the access-to-justice gap and
the public-interest drift—against the backdrop of the student loan crisis and
the possible answers that the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program could
provide in addressing these issues. Part IV describes the data collected from
the original survey, the methods used to analyze these data, and reports and
discusses the results. The findings reported in Part IV offer insight into how
1.3 percent decreased likelihood of marriage in the first four years after college); Alvaro
Mezza, Daniel Ringo, and Kamila Sommer, Can Student Loan Debt Explain Low
Homeownership Rates for Young Adults?, FED. RESERVE BOARD, January 2019,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/consumer-community-context201901.pdf (discussing how student loan debt loads decrease homeownership rates); and
Vadim Revzin and Segei Revzin, Student Debt Is Stopping U.S. Millenials from Becoming
Entrepreneurs, HARVARD BUS. REV., April 26, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/04/student-debtis-stopping-u-s-millennials-from-becoming-entrepreneurs (examining how student loan debt
impacts rates of student loan borrowers from starting their own businesses).
8
See, e.g., Steven A. Boutcher Anna Raup-Kounovsky, and Carroll Seron,
Financing Legal Education Through Student Loans: Results from a Quasi-Experiment
in Tuition Remission, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 755, 757 (2018) (presenting an analysis of
students at the University of California Irvine School of Law and the impact of the
school’s tuition remission program on student debt); John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired
Guns? An Empirical Analysis of Public Interest Drift in Law School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1973, 1989 (2018) (analyzing data from a longitudinal study of students at an
unnamed top-tier law school to determine, in part, what effect debt has on career choice).
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a law student’s endowed and acquired traits influence their career intentions
and provide evidence of the causal relationship between loan debt and career
choice and intentions to enroll in the Public Service Loan Forgiveness
program. Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting that the Public Service
Loan Forgiveness program presents the best available option to address
problems stemming from the access-to-justice gap and the public-interest
drift, while also offsetting the negative effects of structural stratification in
legal education.
I. THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS
A. No Debt End in Sight
The staggering numbers of outstanding debt alone paint a troublesome
picture of the student loan market, for which there are no easily implemented
solutions nor a clear end in sight. In fact, because the costs of postsecondary
education continue to escalate, the amount that students must borrow to pay
for baccalaureate and postbaccalaureate credentials will also increase. In
terms of all student loans, nearly 60 percent of the baccalaureate Class of
2016 borrowed student loans to attend their postsecondary institution, with
two-thirds of those loans being Federal Direct Loans.9 Among law school
graduates, the proportion of students who took out loans to pay for law school
is even greater. Nearly 2 in 3 law graduates paid to attend law school with
student loans, leaving them $145,550 total student loan debt, on average—a
figure which combines their existing student loan debt from their
baccalaureate studies and their law studies.10
9
Matthew P. Diehr, The Looming Threat Posed to Student Loan Lenders and Servicers
by State-Level Actors in an Era of Federal Regulatory Remission, 65 FED. LAW. 43, 43
(2018).The average graduate owed $37,172 in student loans, which is 70 percent greater than
the average member of the Class of 2006. Id. Troublingly, 1 million borrowers will default
on their payments each year, on average. As of August 2018, 11 million of the roughly 44.2
million borrowers are in a state of default or delinquency. Annie Nova, More Than 1 Million
People Default on Their Student Loans Each Year, CNBC (August 13, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/13/twenty-two-percent-of-student-loan-borrowers-fall-intodefault.html.
10
Ryan Lane, Average Student Loan Debt for Law School Graduates, NERDWALLET
(July 24, 2019), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/average-studentloan-debt-law-school-graduates/. At current interest rates, and under a 10-year payment plan,
a law student with $145,550 in student loans would pay $198,700 over 10 years, with average
monthly payments of $1,656, to fully satisfy their student loan debt obligation. Id. See also
Paul Caron, Average Student Loan Debt For Law School Graduates: $145,500, TAXPROF
BLOG (July 12, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/07/average-studentloan-debt-for-law-school-graduates-145500.html. Additionally, these figures fail to include
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Thus, the problem of student loan indebtedness is much worse for those
who choose to attend graduate professional schools, such as medical school
and law school, which is further compounded upon graduation from these
programs by wage stagnation.11 Not only do these graduate degree programs
impose significant costs on students, their cost continues to rise yearly to
untenable rates. In the 20-year period between 2000 and 2019, the costs of
legal education have more than doubled, and in some instances, tripled or
nearly quadrupled.12 For example, in 2000, the average nominal tuition cost,
or “sticker price,” to attend an ABA-approved public law school was $7,790
for residents and $15,683 for non-residents, while the average tuition cost of
a private law school was $21,790.13 In 2019, the sticker price of ABAapproved public law school was $28,186 for residents and $41,628 for nonresidents, while the average tuition cost of a private law school was
$49,312.14 Accordingly, the amount of money each law student must borrow
must also rise to meet the increased price of tuition. Studies of debt-toearnings ratios indicate that the issue of student debt is pervasive across
graduates from many law schools,15 but what these distressing figures fail to
other necessary expenses and possible debts that law students already carry, such as credit
card debt. In 2008, 92 percent of graduate students who used a credit card had an average
debt balance of $8,612. Jusitn R. La Mort, Generation Debt and the American Dream: The
Need for Student Loan Reform, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, at footnote 2 (2010),
https://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/generation-debt-and-the-american-dream-the-needfor-student-loan-reform/. With modern inflation rates applied, even if the amount of credit
card debt did not change at all, the amount of credit card debt would be more than $12,000.
See id.
11
See, e.g., Annie Lowery, The College Wealth Premium Has Collapsed, THE
ATLANTIC
(January
8,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/college-wealth-premiumcollapsed/604579/.
12
Law
School
Costs
Tuition,
LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY,
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/tuition/. In fact, the rapid increase in cost of
attendance may be tied not only to simultaneous increases in the cost of higher education
generally but also declining law school enrollment. See John R. Brooks, Curing the Cost
Disease: Legal Education, Legal Services, And the Role of Income-Contingent Loans, 68 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 521, 524 (forthcoming 2020) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3253344. “According
to the American Bar Association, in-state tuition for public law schools rose from $2,006 in
1985 to $23,879 in 2013, an increase of over 1000% over 29 years (an average annual growth
rate of about 9.3%). Private law school tuition and fees rose from $7,526 to $41,985, an
increase of over 450% (6.35% per year). Over the 1999-2013 period, these growth rates were
8.62% and 5.18%, respectively.” Id. at 524. See also Boutcher, et al., supra note 8, at 756.
13
Law
School
Costs
Tuition,
LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY,
https://data.lawschooltransparency.com/costs/tuition/.
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Which California Law School Provides the Best Debt-toEarnings Ratio for Grads? Find Out Here, LAW.COM (December 4, 2019)
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/12/04/which-ca-law-school-provides-the-best-debt-
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show is which students must borrow more than others to pay for their graduate
professional credentialing.
B. A Demography of Student Loan Debt
One would assume that there would be a strong and negative correlation
between household income and the amount of student loans required to
finance a postsecondary education degree; that is, as household income
increases, the amount of student loans borrowed should decrease. However,
recent studies have shown that members of the middle class actually take out
more loans than both higher-income and lower-income families, particularly
to pay for a baccalaureate degree.16 This descriptive fact seems fairly
obvious, given that higher-income families typically do not need to take out
loans—or may require much smaller loan amounts—while the lowestincome families tend to accrue relatively small amounts of loan debt in the
context of paying for college, given the infrastructure of institutional needbased aid.17 Additionally, many of these same studies suggest that students
to-earnings-ratio-for-grads-find-out-here/; Karen Sloan, Which Law School in NY Provides
the Best Debt-to-Earnings Ratio for Grads? Take a Look, LAW.COM (December 4, 2019)
https://www.law.com/2019/12/04/which-law-school-in-ny-provides-the-best-debt-toearnings-ratio-for-grads-take-a-look/; Karen Sloan, Here’s a Look at the Debt-to-Earnings
Ratios for Grads from Top Law Schools, LAW.COM (December 3, 2019)
https://www.law.com/2019/12/03/heres-a-look-at-debt-to-earnings-ratios-for-grads-fromtop-law-schools/; Wesley Whistle, Is Your Law School Worth It?, FORBES (November 21,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleywhistle/2019/11/21/is-your-law-school-worthit/#30fec6bf38c7; Derek Muller, Which Law Schools Have the Best and Worst Ratios among
Recent
Graduates?,
EXCESS
OF
DEMOCRACY
(November
21,
2019),
https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2019/11/which-law-schools-have-the-best-and-worstdebt-to-income-ratios-among-recent-graduates.
16
See, e.g., Jason N. Houle, Disparities in Debt: Parents’ Socioeconomic Resources and
Young Adult Student Loan Debt, 87 SOC. OF EDUC. 53, 55 (2013) (noting that “children from
middle-income families make too much money to qualify for student aid packages, but they
do not have the financial means to cover the costs of college.”); Dirk Witteveen & Paul
Attewell, Social Dimensions of Student Debt: a Data Mining Analysis, 49 J. OF STUDENT
FIN. AID 1,16 (2019). See also Hillary Hoffower, 6 Findings that Show the Dire State of
America’s Middle Class, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2019, 12:40 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/america-shrinking-middle-class-debt-homeownershipretirement-savings-2019-5 (noting that “nearly half” of middle-class students have student
loans, compared to 39% of affluent students).
17
See Houle, supra note 16, at 58-62. See also Sandy Baum & Martha Johnson, Student
Debt: Who Borrows Most? What Lies Ahead?, URBAN INSTITUTE 17-18 (April 2015)
(discussing the fact that student borrowers from the highest family income bracket only
account for 14% of students who have borrowed more than $50,000, and, alternatively, that
student borrowers from the lowest family income bracket only account for 15% of students
who have borrowed more than $50,000). Witteveen & Attewell, supra note 16, at 16 (noting
that students from wealthier families tend to borrow less than lower- and middle- class
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who come from the lowest income bracket and students whose parents had
low levels of educational attainment are less likely to pursue graduate or
professional degrees.18 Those who do pursue professional degrees account
for a significant proportion of the student loan debt, since they must take out
loans of a greater amount to pay for each year of additional schooling.19
But family income and parental education are not the only factors related
to student loan indebtedness. While myriad factors have been identified as
contributing to student loan indebtedness,20 several studies have
demonstrated that race is closely linked to student loan indebtedness.21 On
students. Also noting that when “one controls for cost of institution it is clear that lower
income students are most burdened by debt”). Additionally, scholars have noted that the
drop-out rate is higher for students from the lowest-income families. See generally, Houle,
supra note 16, at 60; Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Dana C. Perantie, Samuel H. Taylor, Shenyang
Guo, and Ramesh Raghavan, Racial Disparities in Education Debt Burden Among Low-and
Moderate-Income Households, 65 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 166 (2016).
18
See Houle, supra note 16, at 55, 66; Eric F. Dubow et al., Long-Term Effects of
Parent’s Education on Children’s Educational and Occupational Success: Mediation by
Family Interaction, Child Aggression, and Teenage Aspirations, 55 MERRILL-PALMER Q.: J.
OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 224, 232-33.
19
Houle, supra note 16, at 55. See also Sandy Baum & Patricia Steele, Graduate
and Professional School Debt: How Much Students Borrow, ACCESSLEX INSTITUTE
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 18-02 at 4. (noting that, although they only represent 17% of
student loan borrowers, graduate and professional students account for 38% of all
student loan debt).
20
Age is one such factor. With annual increases to tuition rates every year and the
fact that the average borrower tends to pay down some amount of their loans annually,
the youngest student loan borrowers tend to owe more than borrowers that are further
removed from their postsecondary and graduate studies. See Valerie Fontenot,
Disparities in Student Loans, How Did We Get Here, and What Can We Do?, ABA J.
(July 16, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversityinclusion/articles/2019/summer2019-disparities-in-student-loans/. Another factor is
gender. “[W]omen who graduated in the 2007–2008 school year have only paid off an
average of 33 percent of their student debt, while men have paid off an average of 44 percent
of their debt during the same time frame. This is an 11 percent disparity among genders who
were all employed full time. The numbers are even more extreme when considering the rate
of debt repayment for black and Hispanic women.” Id. (citing AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN,
Deeper in Debt: Women and Student Loans (2017), available at:
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED580345.pdf).
21
See generally Grinstein-Weiss, et al., supra note 17, at 166; Houle, supra note 16, at
60. See also Robert Hiltonsmith, Small Loans, Big Risks: Major Consequences for Student
(2019
available
at:
Debtors,
DEMOS
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Small%20Loans%20Big%20Risk%
20.pdf (noting that “borrowers of color face greater difficulty repaying their loans). It should
be noted that racial and ethnic groups outside of whites and African-Americans are either
statistically underrepresented or not the topic many studies in this area, including the studies
mentioned in this note. See Jason N. Houle & Fenaba R. Addo, Racial Disparities in Student
Debt and the Reproduction of the Fragile Black Middle Class, 5 SOCIOLOGY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY 562, 562 (2018) (focusing on how student loan debt affects black youth); Janice

8

PAYING FOR LAW SCHOOL

[29-JAN-20]

average, while around 59.9 percent of white students end up taking out
student loans, 86.8 percent of African-American students need to do the
same.22 Although the figures may fluctuate annually, African-American and
Hispanic students tend to incur drastically more debt than both their white
counterparts and all other racial and ethnic groups.23 And perhaps because
student loan debt rates are higher for college graduates of color than their
white peers, unrepresented racial minority students tend to pursue graduate
degrees at a much lower rate than do white students, indicating that the
intersectionality of race and debt may impact an individual’s decision
whether to acquire a graduate education.24
The 2018 Law School Survey of Student Engagement (LSSSE) offers
important insight about the demography of student loan debt for law students.
The results of the LSSSE survey reveal that students from the lowest
McCabe & Brandon A. Jackson, Pathways to Financing College: Race and Class in
Student’s Narratives of Paying for School, 3 SOCIAL CURRENTS 367, 367 (2016) (focusing
primarily on differences between white and African-American students). But see DEMOS,
Latinos, Student Debt, and Financial Security
(2016), available at:
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Latinos%20Student%20Debt%20an
d%20Financial%20Security.pdf (focusing on the impact of student loans on Latinos).
22
Rebecca Safier, Study: Student Loans Weigh Heaviest on Black and Hispanic
LOAN
HERO
(September
17,
2018),
Students,
STUDENT
https://studentloanhero.com/featured/study-student-loans-weigh-heaviest-black-hispanic/
(cited 2018 data from the National Center for Education Statistics). See also Grinstein-Weiss
et al., supra note 17, at 166-67. (noting that “[b]lack students progress through college and
exit with significantly more debt than do peers from other racial or ethnic groups, a finding
that holds across institutions, degree type, and area of study.”). Also, on average, recent
African American college graduates owe $7400 more than recent white graduates. See Dana
Goldstein, The Morehouse Gift, in Context: An Average Black Graduate Has $7,400 More
in Debt Than White Peers, NEW YORK TIMES (May 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/us/student-debt-america.html; Judith Scott-Clayton
& Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples after Graduation,
BROOKINGS (October 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/black-white-disparityin-student-loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation/; Grinstein-Weiss et al., supra note
17, at 171. Finally, and relatedly, it will also take African American borrowers longer to pay
off their student loans than their white borrowers. Jillian Berman, 12 Years After Starting
College, White Men Have Paid Off 44% of Their Student Loans, While Black Women Owe
13% More, MARKET WATCH (August 11, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/12years-after-starting-college-white-men-have-paid-off-44-of-their-student-loans-and-blackwomen-owe-13-more-2019-06-06.
23
See, e.g., Richard Pallardy, Racial Disparities in Student Loan Debt, CNBC (August
27, 2019), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/racial-disparities-in-student-loan-debt.
See also Scott-Clayton & Li, supra note 22; Safier, supra note 22; Houle, supra note 16, at
60; Grinstein-Weiss, et al., supra note 17, at 166.
24
In 2018, underepresented racial minority students made up roughly 24% of all
graduate students. HIRANAO OKAHANA & ENYU ZHOU, GRADUATE ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES: 2008
TO
2018,
COUNCIL
OF
GRADUATE
SCHOOLS
(2019),
https://cgsnet.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/CGS_GED18_Report_web.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
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socioeconomic backgrounds, as proxied by parental education, expect the
greatest debt loads upon graduating from law school.25 In fact, among law
students expecting to owe between $180,000 and $200,000, 40 percent of
these students have parents whose highest level of educational attainment was
less than a baccalaureate degree. And this proportion increases—albeit
slightly—among students who expect to owe more than $200,000.26 Thus,
unsurprisingly, students from the lowest socioeconomic backgrounds borrow
the most to finance their legal education and are on the hook for the largest
debt sums as a result.
Figure 1:

25

The data source from these figures and the information presented in this section is the
2018 Law School Survey of Student Engagement (LSSSE). While these figures can be
replicated on LSSSE’s interactive website, using its Public Reporting Tool, these figures
were created for guest blog post I wrote for the LSSSE blog. See LSSSE Public Reporting
Tool, LSSSE, available at: http://lssse.indiana.edu/advanis/; Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Paying
for Law School and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, LSSSEBLOG (June 14,
2019),
http://lssse.indiana.edu/blog/guest-post-paying-for-law-school-and-the-publicservice-loan-forgiveness-program/. LSSSE uses the term “First Gen,” short for firstgeneration student, to refer to students who reported that neither parent or guardian holds a
bachelor’s degree. While levels of parental education are not necessarily interchangeable
with levels of parental income, parental education is a common proxy for socioeconomic
status, because the two are highly correlated. See, e.g., The Relationship of Parents’
Education (SES) to Adult Outcomes, OFFICE OF THE ASST. SEC. FOR PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (August 1, 2000),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/long-term-impact-adolescent-risky-behaviors-and-familyenvironment/4-relationship-parents-education-ses-adult-outcomes.
26
See LSSSE Public Reporting Tool, supra note 25.
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Furthermore, students from underrepresented racial minority groups in
law schools account for the largest expected law school debt loads. A
disproportionate amount of underrepresented racial minority students expect
to hold more than $100,000 in student loan debt upon graduating from law
school.27 And of the students surveyed by LSSSE who expected to owe more
than $200,000 in law school loans following their graduation, 53 percent
identified with a racial group other than white.28 Thus, the disparate impact
of the highest law school loans is greatest among underrepresented racial
minorities.
Figure 2:

That law students from unrepresented racial minority backgrounds expect
to hold the greatest debt from attending law school is concerning enough. But
this fact, taken together with the reality that underrepresented racial minority
students are unlikely to make significant progress paying down their loans
after graduation and are substantially more likely to default on their loans
than their white peers, is all the more worrying.29 Fortunately, income-based
27

Id.
Id.
29
While default rates and rates of paying down loans among law graduates are
unavailable, many believe that they mirror the rates of student loan default and repayment
more generally. See, e.g., Janelle Marte, Black Student Loan Borrowers Are Defaulting at
Nearly Twice the Rate of Whites: NY Fed, REUTERS (November 13, 2019),
28
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repayment options for student loans make paying back significant debt loads
for law school graduates more manageable. One repayment option, the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, even forgives borrowers a
portion of their student loan debt. However, the future of the PSLF program
remains uncertain, as the Department of Education, as well as President
Trump, have announced plans to eliminate the PSLF program.30 With the
future of this program in question, debt relief may be effectively foreclosed
to a number of law school graduates, especially those pursuing careers in the
public sector.
II. THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM
A. An Overview of the PSLF Program
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness program is a loan forgiveness
program that allows individuals engaged in public service careers to have
their remaining student loan balance forgiven after paying into the program
for 10 years of full-time employment with a government organization, or a
qualifying public service or tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code.31 The program was designed to incentivize
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-debt-race/black-student-loan-borrowers-aredefaulting-at-nearly-twice-the-rate-of-whites-ny-fed-idUSKBN1XN25M (reporting a 17.7
percent default rate among borrowers from majority-black neighborhoods versus a 9 percent
default rate among borrowers from majority-white neighborhoods); Ben Miller, New Federal
Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education(October
16,
postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal-data-show-student-loan-crisisafrican-american-borrowers/ (discussing that, on average, white students had paid down their
loans, 12 years after graduation, while African-American and Latino students had not, and
that default rates among baccalaureate degree holders were highest for African-Americans
(23 percent) and Latinos (14 percent), as compared with whites (9 percent)); and Judith ScottClayton & Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More Than Triples After
Graduation, BROOKINGS (October 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/blackwhite-disparity-in-student-loan-debt-more-than-triples-after-graduation/ (noting a 7.6
percent default rate for African-Americans versus a 2.4 percent default rate for white
graduates within four years of graduation).
30
Zack Friedman, Trump Proposes to End Student Loan Forgiveness Program,
FORBES,
March
12,
2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/03/12/trump-proposes-to-endstudent-loan-forgiveness-program/#3cb3d8e5415e.
31
The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, FEDERAL STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/publicservice#qualifying-employment. Borrowers can have their student loan debt forgiven after
120 qualifying monthly payments, resulting in often substantial debt forgiveness. Id.
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students to pursue careers in public service—such as teaching, working for a
governmental agency, or as a public interest attorney—given that these
careers often offer substantially less compensation than careers in the private
sector.32 The rationale behind the PSLF program is that student debt is
difficult to pay off, no matter what field one enters, but because public service
work pays significantly less than private sector work, borrowers in public
service professions need additional repayment assistance, including loan
forgiveness.33 Graduates from specialized professional training programs,
like physicians and lawyers, typically encounter even greater student debt
than those with only a baccalaureate degree, making loan repayment even
more difficult when these graduates work in public interest careers.34 Thus,
the PSLF program can be seen as offsetting lower pay in careers that serve a
critical public need by incentivizing skilled graduates to take those jobs.
Created by Congress, the PSLF program operates under the auspices of
the US Department of Education, which has the authority to review
applications and make determinations regarding eligibility of program
participants and their employment with qualifying organizations.35 A
32
See, e.g., Teddy Nykiel, Public Service Loan Forgiveness: What it is, How it Works,
NERDWALLET (May 1, 2019), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/publicservice-loan-forgiveness/.
33
For a complete discussion of the Congressional rationale behind the creation of the
PSLF program, see John P. Hunt, Promoting the Purposes of Student Loans by Tempering
Bankruptcy
Nondischargability,
SSRN
Working
Paper
(2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3399987 and Philip G. Schrag,
Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers and Other
Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27 (2007).
34
See, e.g., Allana Akhtar & Hillary Hoffower, How Grad Schools Became the Hidden
Culprit behind America’s Student-Debt Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (August 22, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/graduate-student-loan-debt-nationwide-crisis-2019-8
(noting that as much as half of all student loan debt is from graduate school loans); and
Victoria J. Haneman, Intergenerational Equity, Student-Loan Debt, and Taxing Rich Dead
People, 39 VA. TAX REV. ___ (forthcoming 2019), available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427834
(discussing
difficulties
borrowers encounter in repaying student loans); Schrag, supra note 33 (explaining why the
PSLF program was created—notably recognizing the program’s benefits for public interest
attorneys); and Patricia Steele and Chad Anderson, Loan Counseling for Graduate and
Professional Students: The Need for Expanded Financial Literacy Education, AccessLex
Inst. Research Paper No. 16-02 (2016), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752612
(arguing that graduate and professional students need greater access to financial literacy
education, given that they incur debt at higher rates and in higher amounts than other student
loan borrowers).
35
College Cost Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, §401, 121 Stat. 784, 800-01. See
also 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1) (giving the Secretary of the US Department of Education the
authority to “cancel the balance of interest and principal due . . . on any Federal Direct Loan
not in default for a borrower” who is a qualifying applicant for loan forgiveness under the
PSLF program).
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borrower can qualifying for the PSLF program by satisfying all of the
following conditions:36 (1) working full-time (at least 30 hours per week) for
a government agency or for certain types of nonprofit organizations;37 (2)
holding Federal Direct Loans—subsidized, unsubsidized, or PLUS loans (or

36

See Higher Education Opportunity Act, 110 Pub. L. No. 315, § 451, 122 Stat. 3078,
3262. In particular, this Act contains the following provisions:
“(B) . . . The term ‘public service job’ means . . . a full-time job in
emergency management, government (excluding time served as a member
of Congress), military service, public safety, law enforcement, public
health (including nurses, nurse practitioners, nurses in a clinical setting,
and full-time professionals engaged in health care practitioner occupations
and health care support occupations, as such terms are defined by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics), public education, social work in a public child
or family service agency, public interest law services (including
prosecution or public defense or legal advocacy on behalf of low-income
communities at a nonprofit organization), early childhood education
(including licensed or regulated childcare, Head Start, and State funded
prekindergarten), public service for individuals with disabilities, public
service for the elderly, public library sciences, school-based library
sciences and other school- based services, or at an organization that is
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code; or (ii) teaching
as a full-time faculty member at a Tribal College or University as defined
in section 316(b) and other faculty teaching in high- needs subject areas or
areas of shortage (including nurse faculty, foreign language faculty, and
part-time faculty at community colleges), as determined by the Secretary.
. . . The following do NOT apply: (1) Labor unions, (2) Partisan political
organizations, (3) For-profit organizations (this includes for-profit
government contractors), (4) Not-for-profit organizations that are not taxexempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and that do
not provide a qualifying public service as their primary function.”
Id.
37
Public Service Loan Forgiveness: Questions and Answers for Federal Student Loan
Borrowers,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/publicservice/questions (containing the following guidance: “[t]he specific job you perform does
not matter, so long as you are employed by an eligible public service organization.”).
Importantly, the borrower also has to certify qualifying employment on an annual basis. In
2012, the Department of Education introduced the Employer Certification Form (ECF),
largely in response to the ambiguity surrounding which organizations were qualifying
employment organizations for purposes of the PSLF program. The Department of Education
has considerable discretion in making PSLF-related decisions and determinations, including
which employment organizations make borrowers eligible for participation in the program,
which have led to a number of lawsuits and are discussed later in this Article. All borrowers
who seek to apply for PSLF eligibility must submit an ECF at least once but are encouraged
to do so each year to be sure that their employer still qualifies as a “Public Service Job.” See
PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS DATA, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/datacenter/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data (last visited January 2, 2020).
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consolidate other federal student loans);38 (3) repaying those loans on an
income-driven repayment plan;39 and ultimately, (4) making 120 total
qualifying payments.40 Once a borrower qualifies for eligibility to pay into
the program by satisfying the first three program requirements, the
borrower’s loan is transferred from the Department of Education to the
agency’s loan servicing contractor, FedLoan, which oversees the loans for
PSLF program participants and handles all approved loan cancellations.41
After a borrower has made 120 qualifying payments, which need not be
consecutive, the borrower may submit an application to the Department of
Education to have the remaining balance of their Federal Direct Loans (or
consolidated loans) forgiven.42 However, while the PSLF program may seem
fairly straightforward, its implementation has been anything but. In fact, the
PSLF program is something of a political football, having been passed
between three presidential administrations and multiple Congresses.
B. A Chronology of the PSLF Program and Its Implementation
The PSLF Program traces its origins to the 110th Congress, which drafted
the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, signed into law in 2007 by
President Bush.43 The College Cost Reduction and Access Act was a farreaching Act that provided new and innovative ways to help students pay for
post-secondary education—including the creation of the PSLF program—
and modified or increased funding for student loans and pre-existing
programs to make post-secondary education more affordable, in addition to
making investments in Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other
Minority-Serving Institutions. Just one year later, in 2008, the Higher
Education Act of 1965 was reauthorized with the passage of the Higher
38
See Andrew Pentis, Your Guide to Understanding Every Student Loan Available
Today, STUDENT LOAN HERO (June 2017), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/types-ofstudent-loans-every-option-explained/.
39

All income-based payment plans qualify for PSLF, namely: Pay as You Earn (PAYE),
Income-Based Repayment (IBR) and Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR). See id.
40

FEDERAL STUDENT AID: PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/publicservice#qualifying-employment (last visited Oct. 30, 2019).
41
See Nykiel, supra note 32. FedLoan is the d/b/a name for the Pennsylvania Higher
Education Assistance Agency. See also FedLoan Servicing, PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY, https://myfedloan.org (accessed January 2, 2020).
Currently, FedLoan services about one third of all Federal Direct Loans. See Federal Student
Aid, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/servicers (accessed January 2,
2020.
42

Interest and taxes accrued will also be forgiven for unsubsidized loans. See id.
See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Title IV, Sec. 401, § 455(m), 121 Stat.
784, 801 (2007) (setting forth the requirements for the PSLF program).
43
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Education Opportunity Act, also signed into law by President Bush, and
functioned similarly to the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, but
notably modified several of the programs newly created by the College Cost
Reduction and Access Act, including adding or subtracting funding
provisions for such.44 However, with regard to the PSLF program, the most
significant impact of the Higher Education Opportunity Act was its widening
of the definition of a “Public Service Job,” to include professions that were
not originally considered as qualifying public service occupations under the
College Cost Reduction and Access Act.45
However, while the Bush and Obama presidencies were responsible for
the creation and early roll-out of the PSLF program, neither administration
had to directly deal with its actual implementation, given that the first wave
of program participants were not eligible for loan forgiveness under the
program until late 2017—ten years after the program’s creation—under the
Trump administration.46 In fact, with implementation of loan forgiveness
nearing, plans for the reduction of the PSLF program began with President
Obama’s proposal to cap loan forgiveness at $57,500 for new borrowers and
have continued under the Trump administration, which—in coordination
with the House of Representatives in 2016—called for the elimination of the
PSLF program for new borrowers.47 Principally, these measures were
proposed because funding for the program appeared, prospectively, to be
insufficient.
Thus, in 2018, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act in
response to the Department of Education’s request for the temporary
expansion of the PSLF program, providing the Department of Education with
an additional $700 million from Congress to spend over two years on
administering the program.48 But even with this funding measure, the PSLF
44

See generally, Higher Education Opportunity Act, 122 Stat. 3078.
Id. at § 451, 122 Stat. 3078. at 3261-3263 (including librarians, public services for the
elderly, public interest law services, and others).
46
See Farran Powell, The Fate of Public Service Loan Forgiveness, U.S. NEWS (October
3,
2017,
9:30AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-forcollege/articles/2017-10-03/the-fate-of-public-service-loan-forgiveness (noting
that
the earliest an eligible borrower could reach forgiveness was Fall of 2017).
47
See H.R. REP. NO. 114-47 (2015) (discussing the House’s proposal to eliminate the
PSLF program for new borrowers); Josh Mitchell, 2015 Budget: White House Proposes
Broader Debt Forgiveness for Students, WALL ST. J. (March 4, 2014),
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/03/04/2015-budget-white-house-proposes-broaderdebt-forgiveness-for-students/ (noting President Obama’s proposed cap on the PSLF
program).
48
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub, L, No. 115-141, § 315, 132 Stat. 348,
752-753. It also allowed public servants who had been enrolled in a wrong repayment plan—
which would render them unable to qualify for loan forgiveness under the PSLF—to have
another chance to successfully apply for PSLF, even if they had already submitted an
45
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program has found itself in the political crosshairs. As of March 2019, the
Trump administration proposed to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965
yet again by eliminating the PSLF program altogether, amidst the most recent
onslaught of budget cuts.49 And this proposal is just one of the many plans to
eliminate the PSLF program going forward, in light of the significant costs
associated with administering the program, making the program and the
student loan crisis a touchpoint in the 2020 Democratic Party presidential
debates.50 Congress has also made changes to its Fiscal Year 2020 budget to
application for loan forgiveness that had been denied. See FEDERAL STUDENT AID:
TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM.
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service/temporaryexpanded-public-service-loan-forgiveness (last visited January 2, 2020); Sarah Kessler,
Temporary Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness: Everything You Need to Know,
STUDENT DEBT RELIEF (August 17, 2018), https://www.studentdebtrelief.us/student-loanforgiveness/programs/temporary-expanded-public-service-loan-forgiveness/; Aimee Picchi,
Student Loan Relief for Public Servants: 38,460 Applied, Only 262 Accepted, CBS NEWS
(April 4, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-loan-relief-for-public-servantsmany-apply-few-are-accepted/.
49
Zack Friedman, Trump Proposes to End Student Loan Forgiveness Program, FORBES
(March 12, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/03/12/trump-proposesto-end-student-loan-forgiveness-program/#14afa143415e (noting that “[t]he proposal would
impact borrowers who borrow a new student loan starting July 1, 2020, excluding borrowers
who are completing their current course study.”). See also Pub. Papers, Proposals to Reform
The Higher Education Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (March 18, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/HEA-Principles.pdf;
Gregory
Crespi, The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program: The Need for Better Employment
Eligibility Regulations, 66 BUFFALO L. REV. 820, 831(2018).
50
Although the topic of student loan debt forgiveness started out as a peripheral issue in
the 2016 presidential race, with Senator Bernie Sanders being one of the few candidates to
discuss the matter in a serious way, it has become one of the foremost hot-button issues of
the 2020 election. See, e.g., Kamenetz, supra note 1; and Carmin Chappell, Here’s How the
Democratic Presidential Candidates Plan to Address the Student Debt Crisis, CNBC (July
30, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/democratic-presidential-candidates-plans-foraddressing-student-debt.html. Thus far, Sanders has proposed not only to eliminate tuition at
public colleges, but also to cancel all outstanding student loan debt with under the College
for All Act of 2019. Id. Curiously, or perhaps intentionally, the Sanders’ sponsored College
for All Act does not mention the PSLF program, nor does it discuss a budget for his new
programs. College for All Act of 2019, H.R. 3472, 116th Cong. § 402(2019). Senator
Elizabeth Warren and former Vice President Joe Biden have also proposed various plans to
solve the student loan crisis and make college more affordable for all. See Kamenetz, supra
note 1. Thus, commentators have called the 2020 Democratic field “an ‘arms race’ for ‘who
can be the most ambitious and expansive when it comes to tackling the cost of higher
education.’” Id. Each candidate plans on funding their proposed loan debt cancellation with
new taxes: Senator Warren would tax the wealthy, while Senator Sanders plans on taxing
Wall Street. Id. The candidates’ plans seem keenly responsive to overwhelming public
support of student loan repayment reform. See also Sarah Sattlemayer & Rich Williams,
Americans Support Federal Action to Make Student Loan Repayment Easier, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (October 4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
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eliminate the PSLF program and adopt a further modified income-driven
repayment plan, the Revised Pay as You Earn program, that creates a system
to forgive all student debts remaining after as few as 180 months of qualifying
payments.51
While the proposed budget carries an estimated savings of $1.459 billion
by 2020 and $53 billion by 2029 after the elimination of PSLF program,52
forgiving all debts after at most 30 years of Income-Based Repayment could
be conceivably much more costly for taxpayers, creating many negative
externalities.53 For example, scholars have noted that students rely on
programs like the PSLF program to fund their educations, and the repeal of
these programs would leave many borrowers unable either to repay their
loans or pursue postsecondary education, especially graduate education, at
all.54 Furthermore, canceling the PSLF program could result in law-trained
graduates being suddenly unwilling to take public sector jobs due to their

analysis/articles/2019/10/14/americans-support-federal-action-to-make-student-loanrepayment-easier.
51
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, ACCOUNTABLE: AN AMERICAN
BUDGET (2019). “The Single IDR plan would cap a borrower’s monthly payment at 12.5
percent of discretionary income. For undergraduate borrowers, any balance remaining after
180 months of repayment would be forgiven. For borrowers with any graduate debt, any
balance remaining after 30 years of repayment would be forgiven.” Id. at 32. Again, the
proposal would impact borrowers who borrow a new student loan starting July 1, 2020,
excluding borrowers who are completing their current course study. See Friedman, supra
note 49.
52

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 51, at 119 (explaining the potential
savings gained by eliminating the PSLF program).
53
Without the program, students are faced with higher monthly payments and thus
encounter significant difficulty in paying for things like rent and utilities. Moreover, when
students struggle with debt, without any relief, they cannot fully participate the economy.
See generally Thomas M. Susman, With Your Help the ABA is Working to Save Public
Service Loan Forgiveness, 25 PASS IT ON: NEWSL. GOV'T & PUB. SECTOR LAW. DIV. 4, 4
(2016); Ryan Liebenthal, Unforgivable, 43 MOTHER JONES 5, 16-25 (Oct. 2018).
54
“If [the repeal of PSLF] occurs it will be very disappointing if not financially
devastating to the hundreds of thousands to perhaps millions of persons who will not yet
have qualified for debt forgiveness by completing 10 years of public service, but who have
relied on the availability of eventual debt forgiveness in making their borrowing and
subsequent employment decisions.” Gregory Crespi, Could the Benefits of the Public Service
Loan Forgiveness Program be Retroactively Curtailed?, CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019).
Although other income-based repayment plans would remain in current budget proposals,
Crespi is critical of the final amount forgiven being treated as taxable income, mainly
because borrowers will still often end up with a six-figure bill after their loan is “forgiven.”
The budget proposal is silent as to whether the new loan forgiveness program would also
treat the final amount forgiven as taxable income. See id.
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newfound inability to pay back their loans without the help of the PSLF
program.55
C. Is the PSLF Program Working?
The first wave of borrowers became eligible for loan forgiveness under
the PSLF program in the last two years, which has fueled discussions about
the efficacy of the PSLF program centering on whether program is correctly
incentivizing borrowers to pursue careers in the public interest, whether these
borrowers are having their loans forgiven as promised, and if so, whether
there are sufficient financial resources available to fund the program. With
respect to the first question—whether the PSLF program is attracting
individuals to pursue public service jobs—figures from March 2019 are
telling: many borrowers in public service careers are seeking to capitalize on
the promise of loan forgiveness offered by the PSLF program. Of the
3,213,089 Employment Certification Forms submitted to the Department of
Education, 2,181,000—about two-thirds—have been approved.56 Assuming
that each Employment Certification Form is submitted by a borrower seeking
to enroll in PSLF, the number of applicants would make the PSLF program
the second most popular student loan forgiveness program, second only to
the Revised Pay As You Earn plan.57 And this number is expected to grow at
a fairly steady rate, along with an estimated 200,000 additional borrowers
applying for loan forgiveness under the PSLF program per year, after 2018.58
In fact, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau projects that up to 25
percent of all jobs in the United States could qualify for PSLF, meaning that
many more borrowers who have not yet applied for eligibility could
conceivably do so, conditional on maintaining qualifying employment and
paying into the program.59
However, with respect to the second question—whether PSLF
participants can expect their debts to be forgiven—recent information about

55

Jack Karp, Are Law Schools Helping Students Who Want To Help Others?, LAW 360
(March 31, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1143092.
56

Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, March 2019 PLSF Report, FEDERAL STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data (last visited Jan.
24, 2020).
57

If all 3,213,089 Employment Certification Forms were approved, the PSLF program
would be the most popular loan repayment program based on number of those enrolled. Id.
58

Crepsi supra note 54, at 34.
See CFPB Spotlights Borrower Complaints About Student Loan Servicers
Mishandling Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, June 22, 2018, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbspotlights-borrower-complaints-about-student-loan-servicers-mishandling-public-serviceloan-forgiveness-program/.
59
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the odds of benefitting from loan forgiveness under the PSLF program paint
a very bleak picture. As of March 2019, only 864 of the 86,006 applications
for loan forgiveness had been approved: a 1 percent approval rate.60
Troublingly, the approval rate has remained static since mid-2018.61 This low
rate of approval for loan forgiveness applicants highlights the fact that the
promise of loan forgiveness is still unattainable for many borrowers, which
has led many borrowers who have paid into PSLF-eligible repayment plans
to file suit against the loan servicers with which the Department of Education
contracts.62 Many reasons have been proffered for the extremely low
60
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, supra note 56. 78 percent of applications are
rejected for either missing information (25 percent) or failure to make 120 qualified
payments (53 percent). An additional 16 percent are rejected due to having loans that do not
qualify for forgiveness. The remaining 4 percent of rejections occur due to clerical errors
regarding employer eligibility and full-time employment calculations.
61
See generally, Annie Nova, Here are the Facts about Public Service Loan
Forgiveness, CNBC (December 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/21/1-percent-ofpeople-were-approved-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness.html; Cory Turner, Why Public
Service Loan Forgiveness is So Unforgiving, NPR (October 17, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/17/653853227/the-student-loan-whistleblower; and Allie
Conti, You're Probably Not Getting That Loan Forgiveness You're Counting On, VICE
(September 21, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kz5zew/youre-probably-notgetting-that-loan-forgiveness-youre-counting-on. But see, Travis Hornsby, PSLF Snowball
Effect: Why the Approval Rate Will Hit Over 50% by 2024, STUDENT LOAN PLANNER (June
29, 2019), https://www.studentloanplanner.com/pslf-snowball-effect/, (using now outdated
data but arguing that the 1 percent approval rate is simply a growing pain of the program’s
implementation).
62
Most of the lawsuits related to PSLF are due to loan servicers giving borrowers the
wrong type of loans or not properly disclosing what type of loans were being administered.
See generally Daniel v. Navient Sols., LLC, 328 F. Supp. 3d, 1319 (D. Fla. 2018). “Plaintiffs
allege that they relied on incorrect information and recommendations given to them by
Defendant regarding their eligibility for student loan forgiveness under the PSLF, resulting
in their mistaken belief that they were eligible for the PSLF program.” Id. See also LawsonRoss v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199048 (alleging that loan
servicer did not inform them that only Direct Loans are eligible for PSLF, resulting in
Plaintiff taking out only private loans but relying on PSLF to pay them off). However, the
most high-profile case regarding the implementation of PSLF program to date has resulted
from litigation between the American Bar Association and the Department of Education over
the issue of the agency’s determinations of qualifying employment via Employment
Certification Forms. Specifically, the American Bar Association alleged that the Department
of Education abused its discretion and arbitrarily subjected Employment Certification Forms
to a “primary purpose test” to determine whether a borrower’s employment was eligible for
PSLF. The federal district court ruled against the Department of Education, stating that they
had no authority to change their standards without informing every borrower who relied on
the agency to provide them with accurate information regarding the eligibility of their
Employment Certification Forms. See ABA v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp.
3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019). However, a notable decision from US Bankruptcy Court in the Southern
District of New York at the time of the writing of this Article has allowed a law school
graduate to erase $220,000 of student loan debt through the bankruptcy process, which could
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approval rate, including missing information in the application, which
accounts for 25 percent of all rejections.63 However, even with a 1 percent
approval rate, the Department of Education still paid out $30.6 million to
forgive the remaining loan balance for the 864 borrowers whom the agency
deemed eligible for loan forgiveness.64 Assuming the average loan
forgiveness amount of $35,4116.67 for all 86,006 applicants for loan
forgiveness, the total discharge amount that the Department of Education
would have to pay would exceed $3.04 billion. This descriptive fact
illustrates the costs of administering the PSLF program and casts doubt on
whether and how financial resources will be martialed to continue to fund the
PSLF program.
D. The Cost of the PSLF Program
Regardless of the many benefits of and successes of the PSLF program,
its critics argue that it is not an economically feasible or sustainable solution
to the problem of student loan debt.65 Simply put, at current rates of
allow borrowers another avenue to loan forgiveness. In re Rosenberg, No. 18-35379 (CGM),
2020 WL 130302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020) (applying the Brunner test, the Court
discharged the debt due to undue hardship).
63
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, supra note 56.
64
Hypothetically, at this rate, if the Department of Education approved all of the
applications for loan forgiveness that were dismissed for missing information, the total
payout would be astronomical. Based on PSLF program data, 25 percent of the 85,000
rejected applications is 21,250. The average balance discharged per borrower is
approximately $59,000, which, multiplied by 21,250, brings the total payout to roughly $1.25
billion, symptomatic of the extremely high costs of administering the program. Id.
65
See, e.g., Wesley Whistle, The Problem with Public Service Loan Forgiveness? It’s
Mostly
Working,
FORBES
(December
6,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleywhistle/2019/12/06/the-problem-with-public-serviceloan-forgiveness-its-mostly-working/#3ecfe9bc216c (summarizing the need for reform, in
light of the program’s high costs and the coming wave of borrowers eligible for forgiveness
under the program’s guidelines); Robert Farrington, The Moral Hazard of Student Loan
Forgiveness,
FORBES
(June
25,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2019/06/25/the-moral-hazard-of-studentloan-forgiveness/#5691b2b9364c (discussing the fact that the funding of the PSLF program
is lacking and citing other critics of the program who contend that taxpayers are on the hook
for individual borrowing decisions, in which borrowers lack “skin in the game,” and the fact
that blanket forgiveness does not address rising costs in higher education); Andrew
Kriegbaum, Barriers to Loan Forgiveness, INSIDE HIGHER ED (September 27, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/09/27/unsettled-debate-over-impact-publicservice-loan-forgiveness (reporting a conversation with Jason Delisle, a resident fellow at
the American Enterprise Institute, who noted that the “Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that PSLF could cost as much as $2 billion annually, . . . [and] those future costs
could force lawmakers to re-examine who is benefitting from the program.”); and Jason
Delisle, The Spiraling Costs of a Student Loan Relief Program, POLITICO (July 21, 2017),
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borrowing and program participants, the government cannot afford PSLF.66
Given the 2,181,000 PSLF program participants with approved Employment
Certification Forms, if every present participant were to be approved for loan
forgiveness immediately, the Department of Education have an outstanding
discharge balance of $97.9 billion.67 For perspective, this theoretical
outstanding discharge balance is $27 billion more than the Department of
Education’s estimated spending for 2019 ($70 billion) and $38 billion more
than the approved budget for the Department of Education in 2019 ($59.9
billion).68 Even though law graduates represent a small fraction of this overall
sum, the outstanding discharge balance to forgive law graduates’ debts under
the program would be significant.
Roughly 5,000 law school graduates nationwide from the Class of 2018
entered careers in government or public interest law. Consider the possibility
that 80 percent—or 4,000—of these graduates borrowed loans to attend law
school and remained employed in a PSLF-eligible career for the next 10
years.69 With an estimated $115,000 in debt from law school loans for these
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/07/21/public-service-loan-forgiveness-costdouble-000478 (discussing the same concerns).
66
Based on data released by the Department of Education regarding current PSLF
program statistics, the total loan forgiveness payout would far exceed any realistic budget
that would ever be given to the Department of Education. See Public Service Loan
Forgiveness Data supra note 56.
67
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data supra note 56. This, of course, is a hypothetical
exercise, because the number of PSLF program participants represents all members over a
span of 10 years. However, even assuming current rates of debt hold constant, the
outstanding discharge balance would still be roughly $10 billion per year for the next decade.
68
See Kimberly Amadeo, FY 2019 Federal Budget: Trump’s Budget Request, THE
BALANCE (May 21, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/fy-2019-federal-budget-summaryof-revenue-and-spending-4589082.
69

See Employment Outcomes as of April 2019 (Class of 2018 Graduates) , AM. B. ASS’N
(MAY
4,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/statistics/2018-law-graduate-employment-data.pdf; 2018 Standard 509
Data
Overview,
AM.
B.
ASS’N
(2018)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/statistics/2018-509-enrollment-summary-report.pdf; 2018 Public Service
Attorney Salary Survey, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT,
(2018)
https://www.nalp.org/0618research. While the ABA does not define its classification of
“public interest” careers in its employment data reports, elsewhere, the ABA defines public
interest positions to include “legal services positions that are funded by the Legal Services
Corporation or a similar funding entity; positions with other organizations that provide
indigent or reduced-fee legal services, such as prisoners’ legal services and campus legal
services; and positions with public interest and non-profit employers, including private nonprofit advocacy, religious, social service, fund-raising, community resource, or causeoriented organizations. Public interest employers also include labor unions, non-profit policy
analysis and research organizations, and public and appellate defender positions not funded
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students, and limited ability to pay off their loans as their loan interest
capitalizes, we could assume that the average forgivable loan balance to be
still be as high as $100,000 in 2028.70 This would result in a $400 million
outstanding discharge balance that the Department of Education would be on
the hook to pay for one year’s worth of loan forgiveness for qualifying law
school graduates discharged from their debt obligation. This discharge
balance is more than half of the $700 million Congress approved in the
Temporary Expansion of Public Service Loan Forgiveness in 2018.71 If 4,000
borrowers represent over half of the funds specifically allocated for loan
discharge under the PSLF in 2018, then what is to come of the other 2.1
million potential applicants for loan forgiveness?72
As a corollary to criticism that there may be insufficient funding to
support the PSLF program, critics have noted that this problem may be
exacerbated and indeed caused by overborrowing, or—put another way—
attending an institution that is unaffordable for the average American. Before
fully addressing this negative externality of the program, it is important to
note what specific feature sets the PSLF program apart from all other incomedriven repayment plans, such as Income-Contingent Repayment, IncomeBased Repayment, Pay as You Earn, and Revised Pay as You Earn plans, and
makes it the most attractive option for all who qualify for it. Specifically,
by the government.” 2017 Employment Questionnaire Definitions and Instructions, AM. B.
ASS’N
6
(2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/Questionnaires/2017_eq_definitions_and_instructions.authcheckdam.pdf.
The ABA defines a governmental position as including “federal, state and local governments.
Government positions include positions in governmental agencies, military positions, and
prosecution positions. Government positions also include governmental public defender and
appellate defender positions.” Id.
70
Bob Lotich, Average Law School Debt, THE BALANCE (March 8, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/average-law-school-debt-4588830. One could just as easily
assume negative amortization, which is a reality for many borrowers, especially
underrepresented racial minorities. See Miller, supra note 29. However, given that negative
amortization would probably not be the case for all borrowers, for purposes of this
hypothetical calculation, I have assumed that the average borrower has paid down some of
their outstanding loan debt over a projected fiscal decade.
71
Cory Turner, Congress Promised Student Borrowers A Break. Education Dept.
Rejected
99%
Of
Them,
NPR
(Sep.
5,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/05/754656294/congress-promised-student-borrowers-abreak-then-ed-dept-rejected-99-of-them.
72
Part of the problem of the program’s affordability is the fact that the very bill that
created PSLF program is silent on its funding. Section 455 of The College Cost Reduction
and Access Act of 2007, which established PSLF, does not explicitly mention or even
suggest how the program is to be funded. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, supra
note 44, at 455(m). The same goes for the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Proposal, which, as was
mentioned earlier, instead suggests the elimination of PSLF altogether. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, supra note 52.
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unlike traditional income-driven repayment plans, the final loan amount that
the government forgives under the PSLF program is not treated as taxable
income.73 Thus, although the non-taxability of loan forgiveness makes the
PSLF program an attractive option for certain borrowers, it also removes any
incentive that these borrowers have to regulate the amount that they borrow
when they know that their loan will eventually be forgiven.74
Theoretically, if borrowers have to internalize a cost associated with their
loan forgiveness in the form of income tax, it is likely that the borrower would
be conscientious about the amount of their loan—taking out only what is
essential to fund their education—and even make all efforts to pay down their
loan during the course of their repayment plan. If students behave in an
economically rational manner, then they would only take out student loans
for as much money is necessary to fund their education or as much as they
will one day be able to repay. However, if the borrower’s entire loan is
forgiven after 10 years of payments—regardless of the loan amount or the
repayment that the borrower made—there is little incentive for the borrower
to exercise such restraint or reduce their total debt obligation.75 Moreover,
expecting that their debt obligation will be fully forgiven a priori, prospective
law students may choose to attend more expensive law schools, which could
draw students away from attending less expensive law schools, including
those in rural settings, further reducing the likelihood that these law students
would practice in locations like rural areas that desperately need attorneys.76
73
See, e.g., Robert Farrington, The Student Loan Forgiveness Tax Bomb, FORBES
(January 6, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2020/01/06/the-studentloan-forgiveness-tax-bomb/#450cf5353271. “The main problem with income-driven
repayment plans is the potential for severe tax consequences down the road.” Id. The biggest
drawback to even the most generous income-driven repayment programs is that the amount
ultimately forgiven by these programs is treated as taxable income. “[I]n effect, the
government cancels 100 percent of the debt, but then will turn around and collect 10–40
percent of it anyway.” John R. Brooks, supra note 12, at 850. See also, Gregory Crespi, Will
the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools To Continue To Provide
“Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 SMU L. REV. 1, 145 (2014).
74
See Jason Delisle, The Coming Public Service Loan Forgiveness Bonanza, 2
EVIDENCE SPEAKS REPORTS 2, 5 (Sep. 26, 2016). “Thanks to PSLF, a student like the
hypothetical one above who is faced with the choice of borrowing $10,000 to live frugally
while enrolled in graduate school or $20,000 to support a more comfortable lifestyle is
probably more inclined to choose the latter.” Id. See also Crespi, supra note 73, at 98. That
said, borrowing, of course, is capped at the student’s cost of attendance, setting an upper
boundary to a student’s potential for overborrowing.
75

See Farrington, supra note 65 (classifying this problem as moral hazard).
Hannah Haksgaard, Rural Practice as Public Interest Work, 71 MAINE L. REV. 210,
222 (2019). While serving residents of rural areas was not an explicit goal of the PSLF, its
creators envisioned that the PSLF program and the other facets of the College Cost Reduction
and Access Act would be an investment in “the young people that will take their talents and
provide the next generation of . . . economic activity here at home . . . [T]hat’s the investment
76
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However, in spite of the borrowing decisions made by some individuals who
participate in the PSLF program, it is clear that the PSLF program is
successful at attracting students to careers in public service and thus requires
full federal financial backing to fulfill its promise of loan forgiveness for
qualifying public servants.
III. THE “GAP” AND THE “DRIFT”
A. The Access-to-Justice Gap and Its Causes
The access-to-justice “gap” is defined as the difference between the civil
legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet
those needs.77 And the sheer numbers of people who need civil legal
resources are significant. The most common groups of people who meet the
definition of low-income individuals requiring legal assistance include:
individuals with disabilities (11.1 million); rural residents (10 million);
seniors over the age of 65 (6.4 million); and veterans (1.7 million).78
Addressing the gap requires recognition of the inability of lower-income
Americans to obtain legal services when they are needed and that the legal
profession make reasonable efforts meet that need. Even with pro bono
service requirements and countless no- or low-cost legal services providers,
this is easier said than done.79
we . . . make in the in this generation of young people for the future of this country.” 153
CONG. REC. H21,912 (daily ed. July 11, 2007) (remarks of Rep. Miller). Moreover, the
central purpose of the PSLF program and income-driven repayment plans was to encourage
students to pursue careers with lower salaries, including those in public service and in rural
areas where pay is lower than national averages. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H7554 (daily ed.
July 11, 2007) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
77
The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans,
LEGAL SERV. CORP. 9 (2017). The Legal Services Corporation is a quasi-government entity
created in 1974 to help lower-income Americans gain access to high quality legal aid. For a
brief history of the origin and development of LSC. See Richard A. Cullison, Eliminating
the Justice Gap, 72 BENCH & B. 13, 14 (2008). For clarity and consistency, this Article will
operationalize a definition of “low-income” that is consistent with the definition used by the
Legal Services Corporation: a low-income household is one in which the combined income
is below 125% of the Federal poverty rate. LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 77, at 2.
78

Id. at 6. The most common types of legal issues these low-income Americans
encounter are issues with: rental housing; children and custody; education; disability; income
maintenance; employment; family; health; homeownership; and wills and estates. Id. at 2324.
79
“Nearly every state has an ethical rule that calls upon lawyers to render pro bono
services. A Guide and Explanation to Pro Bono Services, AM. B. ASS’N (July 26, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/pro_bono/. In fact, Montana
and New York have pro bono requirements for admission the bar of each state. The Role of
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The Legal Services Corporation estimates that 71 percent of low-income
households have experienced at least one severe civil legal problem in the
past year, yet only 20 percent of these individuals will seek help for their legal
problems.80 Thus, low-income Americans will receive either inadequate or
no professional legal help for 86% of their civil legal problems in a given
year.81 In reality, the business model of obtaining legal services remains cost
prohibitive to many.82 The primary reasons why low-income households do
not seek legal help is the cost—or expectations of the cost—of such legal
assistance.83 And although organizations like the Legal Services Corporation
Pro Bono Service as a Condition for Receiving a Law License, AM. B. ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/probono_public_service/policy/bar_pre_admission_pr
o_bono/ (last accessed January 24, 2020). Some scholars have actually suggested that pro
bono collaborations between law firms and legal services providers create additional
negative externalities, raising costs for the provision of legal services. See Atinuke O.
Adediran, The Relational Costs of Free Legal Services, 55 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L.
REV. ___ (forthcoming 2020).
80
See Vanita Saleema Snow, The Untold Story of the Justice Gap: Integrating Poverty
Law into the Law School Curriculum, 37 PACE L. REV. 642, 647 (2017) “Living in poverty
leads to legal problems.” Id.
81
LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 77, at 26, 30. See also Andrew M. Perlman, The
Public’s Unmet Need for Legal Services and What Law Schools Can Do About It, 148
DÆDALUS, J. AM. ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES 75, 75-6 (2019); but see, Deborah Rhode,
Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, at
535-37 (2013) (noting that “[a]lthough useful to a point, these studies have inherent
limitations.”).
82
LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 77, at 2. A full 70% of low-income Americans with
civil legal problems reported that at least one of their problems affected them very much or
severely. Id. A more in-depth discussion on the cost of legal aid is included in at Section
III.3. of this report. Id.
83
LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 77, at 13. Additional reasons why low-income
households do not seek legal assistance include not knowing where to look for legal
assistance and being unsure that the issues they experience are legal in nature. Id. However,
it is a well-known fact that the cost of legal representation can be expensive, even for middleincome families, and this impacts how the public perceives the cost of legal representation.
Jason Tashea, Access to Justice Gap? It’s the Economy, AM. B. ASS’N J. (December 17,
2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/access_to_justice_gap_its_the_economy_st
upid. A general trend shows that some clients turn to consumer loans to cover their exuberant
legal fees, which only adds to the problem, as loans quickly become more expensive than
the very fees they were taken out to cover. Id. “One recent survey found, regardless of
economic class and generation, 91 percent of respondents believed that lawyers’ fees were
‘extremely expensive’ and 82 percent wanted alternatives to attorneys when dealing with
small legal matters.” Id. The hourly rates of an attorney, notwithstanding variables like job
type or are of law, can range between $100 and $400 an hour (with a maximum in the area
of
$1000).
How
Much
Are
Attorney’s
Fees?,
THERVO,
(2019),
https://thervo.com/costs/attorney-fees. A general trend shows that some clients turn to
consumer loans to cover their exuberant legal fees, which only adds to the problem, as loans
quickly become more expensive than the very fees they were taken out to cover.
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and the legal aid organizations it funds were approached to assist with 1.7
million civil legal cases in 2017 alone, the agency or its affiliates will only
be able to assist in 59 percent of these cases and fully resolve around just 33
percent of these cases, illustrating the substantial reality of the access-tojustice gap.84
There are many independent factors that have contributed to creating and
widening the access-to-justice gap. Essential legal services offered at no or
low cost are woefully underfunded, and unlike the criminal legal system,
there is no constitutional right to an attorney or legal representation in civil
cases are undeniably contributing factors to the access-to-justice gap.85
84
LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 77, at 10-14. “In 2017, low-income Americans will
likely not get their legal needs fully met for between 907,000 and 1.2 million civil legal
problems that they bring to LSC-funded legal aid programs, due to limited resources among
LSC grantees. This represents the vast majority (85% to 97%) of all of the problems receiving
limited or no legal assistance from LSC grantees.” Id. at 14.
85
See, e.g., Amy Widman & David Udell, Tracking Client Outcomes: A Qualitative
Assessment of Civil Legal Aid’s Use of Outcomes Data, with Recommendations, 25
CARDOZO J. EQ. RIGHTS & SOCIAL JUSTICE 435 (2019) (noting how thinly-funded civil legal
aid services have little capacity or infrastructure for tracking outcomes data); and Philip
Alston, et al., What is Access to Justice? Identifying Unmet Legal Needs of the Poor, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S188, S191 (2000) (acknowledging the underfunding of civil legal
service provision programs) . Given the reality of the ballooning national debt, substantially
increased funding for the Legal Services Corporation seems unlikely. And even if its budget
were doubled overnight, the sudden influx of funding would not necessarily result in a
doubling of its caseload. In fact, some have suggested that a greater budget for the agency
would only result in greater spending to increase the salaries for public interest attorneys,
which—given the dramatic pay differentials between public interest attorneys and the rest of
the legal profession—would not be money badly spent if it were meant to incentivize
attorneys to pursue careers in public interest law. Cullison, supra note 77, at 14. While a
constitutional right to representation in civil legal matters has had many champions over the
years, few have been as influential as Justice Earl Johnson Jr., a former associate justice on
California’s Court of Appeal, who became known as “Mr. Access to Justice” in certain
circles due to his role in drafting the first two versions of the Legal Services Corporation Act
of 1974. Justice Johnson advocated for an expansion of the constitutional right to an attorney
to be extended to both civil and criminal legal matters. He went on to identify the right to an
attorney and the equal ability of all to seek and obtain justice the “cornerstone of American
democracy.” See Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in
the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83 (2000). As
the LSC report notes, although there is no threat of jail time in civil suits, individuals still
stand to lose a great deal as a result of their lack of legal representation. For example, of the
71 percent of low-income households that experienced at least one civil legal problem in
2017, most of the legal problems involved families obtaining access to healthcare, staying in
their homes, and securing safe living conditions for their families. A further 27 percent of
legal problems involved the health and custody of children. LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note
77, at 6. Extrapolating from Justice Johnson’s argument, it is helpful to compare the civil
legal problems mentioned above with some of the low-level crimes that, simply by the nature
of the offense, carry a guarantee of legal representation. Depending on the severity of the
incident, someone in Massachusetts who is found guilty of Negligent Operation of a Motor
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However, the gap is principally owing to the complexity of the American
justice system, the accompanying high costs of the system, and the
comparatively low financial incentives for attorneys to pursue careers in the
public interest.86 The first two of these factors contributing to the access-tojustice gap are hard to pin down and even more difficult to change through
any one solution. But the second and third can be addressed by compensating
public interest lawyers with competitive salaries, or alternatively with
dramatically reduced student loan obligations, so that they can represent
clients for low or no cost.
To put matters simply, legal aid services are underfunded, and public
interest attorneys are notoriously underpaid. According to the most recent
data from the National Association of Law Placement, entry-level civil legal
aid attorneys earn, on average, only $48,000—the lowest of any public
service legal position.87 Perhaps as a result, and there are not enough public
interest attorneys. Due to the substantial cost of attending law school, and the
corresponding debt that many graduates carry following graduation from law
school, it is understandable that law school graduates would be hesitant to
take public interest law jobs that promise notoriously overwhelming
workloads at below-average salaries.88 In fact, results from the first wave of
the After the JD Study—a 2004 study of law school graduates of the Class of
2000, when tuition rates and debt loads were comparatively much lower than
today—demonstrated that 70 percent of law school graduates rated paying

Vehicle may only face a $20.00 fine and a 60-day license suspension period. See Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 90, § 24G. However, given that Negligent Operation of a Motor Vehicle is a crime,
legal counsel will be provided if the individual charged cannot procure legal representation
independently. By contrast, a low-income family of four who are facing eviction and
potentially losing their children due to unsafe living conditions are not constitutionally
guaranteed an attorney if they cannot otherwise obtain one—a stark illustration of the
argument advanced by Justice Johnson and other advocates of a broader constitutional right
to representation. In fact, America differs from the vast majority of European countries by
not providing legal aid to the poor. In Europe, a constitutional right to a fair hearing in a civil
trial requires that the government provide legal aid to the poor; in America, due process is
satisfied in a civil case even though a low-income litigant lacks counsel. See, e.g., Alston,
supra note 85; and Johnson, supra note 85.
86

See also, Cullison, supra note 77, at 14; Perlman, supra note 81, at 76.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAWYER PLACEMENT, New Public Service Attorney
Salary Figures from NALP Show Slow Growth Since 2004, 1, 3 (2018). It must be noted that
the same data shows that the high end of the spectrum for the starting salary of public interest
attorneys is only $58,300 (public defenders).
87

88
See Boutcher, et al., supra note 8; Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained
After College: Student Loans and Early Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149,
note 4 (2001) (discussing the fact that “[d]ebt appears to reduce the probability that students
will choose low-paying public interest jobs.”).
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off student loan debt as a top four concern when looking for jobs after law
school.89
While the shortage of attorneys in public interest law careers is clearly a
function of inadequate remuneration and high debt loads for law-trained
professionals, the spillover effects of this shortage adversely impact the
individuals that could be served by public interest attorneys. And this impact
is particularly acute for individuals in rural areas, who have even fewer
options to engage professional legal services than residents of metropolitan
areas.90 As of 2004, public interest attorneys still only comprise 4 percent of
all practicing attorneys. Of that 4 percent, nearly 42 percent of these public
interest attorneys operate out of New York, Washington D.C., and Chicago
alone.91 Moreover, a public interest attorney in a rural area will, on average,
not only make less than most other attorneys in the country, but will also have
a workload so demanding that they are required to be prosecutors in some

89
See Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, Richard Sander, Joyce Sterling, and Gita Z.
Wilder, After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal Careers, AM. B. FDN. 72
(2004).
90
Haksgaard, supra note 76, at 212-215; Grant Gerlock, Lawyer Shortage in some Rural
Areas
Reach
Epic
Proportions,
NPR
(December
26,
2016)
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/26/506971630/nebraska-and-other-states-combat-rurallawyer-shortage. Several states without a major metropolitan area show up on annual lists
for states with the fewest number of attorneys and the biggest access-to-justice gap, including
North Dakota, Wyoming, South Dakota, and Vermont. See, e.g., Danielle Braff, The Best
Places to Practice, AM. B. ASS’N J. 50 (September-October 2019). Yet, attorneys in rural
areas are also some of the lowest paid attorneys in the country. Private practice attorneys in
South Dakota will make, on average, between $52,000 and $58,000. Haksgaard, supra note
76, at 219. By contrasting, the national median salary for private practice attorneys was
between $98,000 and $155,000, with the majority of the higher-end salaries coming from
metropolitan areas. See, e.g., Private Sector Salaries, NAT’L ASS’N OF LAWYER PLACEMENT
(2018) https://www.nalp.org/privatesectorsalaries. However, many states with the highest
value of purchasing power are also states with the highest access-to-justice gap, such as
Mississippi, Alabama, South Dakota, and Oklahoma. See Braff, supra note 90. A costconscious public interest attorney with no debt would likely find a legal career in a less urban
area—where purchasing power is greatly increased—appealing. This would also track with
a fairly sizeable trend of skilled millennials to relocate to small and mid-sized cities to
increase their purchasing power. See, e.g., Jeffrey Brown & Mike Fritz, Why Millennials Are
Moving away from Large Urban Centers, PBS NEWS HOUR (December 2, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-millennials-are-moving-away-from-large-urbancenters; and Liz Farmer, Millennials Are Coming to America’s Small Towns, WALL STREET
J. (October 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-are-coming-to-americassmall-towns-11570832560.
91
Dinovitzer, et al., supra note 89, at 26. This data is mirrored by the ABA’s most recent
data on the percentage of each graduating class that enters public interest. As of 2018, only
between 3% and 4% of each graduating class enters the public interest field. See AM. B.
ASS’N, supra note 69.
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weeks and defenders others, possibly with 100 miles between the two
courthouses.92
Thus, the problem of the access-to-justice gap has demand-side and
supply-side inputs. And the unfilled supply of attorneys to meet the unmet
legal demand is surely compounded by the rate at which debt increases
among law school graduates. This is the silent wake of the “drift" problem,
explored in the section that follows.
B. The Reality of the “Public-Interest Drift”
With many law students choosing to attend law school with intentions to
“save the world,” the reality that so few will enter careers in the public interest
is perplexing.93 Despite these intentions and stated preferences for careers in
the public sector, most of these students instead decide to pursue careers in
the private sector. This puzzling phenomenon, described by as the “publicinterest drift,” has recently drawn academic attention and examination.
Findings from several recent studies suggest that the amount of loan debt
that a law graduate incurs to attend law school has a substantial impact on the
graduate’s initial job selection.94 However, results from a couple of studies
of graduates from prestigious schools make clear the relationship between
debt obligations and career choice. Specifically, both of these studies
involved the real-world experiment of phasing in a “no-loans policy” to
investigate the effect such a policy had on students’ post-graduate career
choices. And both studies acknowledge a causal relationship between high

92
See, e.g., Gerlock, supra note 90 (discussing how attorneys in rural Nebraska have to
travel as many as one hundred miles to meet with clients that live in towns that used to have
lawyers but no longer do).
93
See, e.g., John Bliss, Drifting Law Students: Public Interest Caught in the Law Firm
Pipeline, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CENTER ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (May/June 2018),
https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/drifting-law-students/.
94
See Boutcher, et al., supra note 8 (examining the no-loan policy at the University of
California-Irvine School of Law and its effect on the jobs that graduates took out of law
school); and Rothstein & Rouse, supra note 88. Rothstein and Rouse’s experiment was
especially telling of the relationship between student loan debt and the likelihood that
students will accept low-paying public interest jobs. The authors were given the unique
opportunity to study the post-grad decisions of students who graduated with student loan
debt and those who graduated debt-free from the same school, due to a program that replaced
the traditional student loan award system with a no-strings-attached grant system. After the
program was fully employed, students who took advantage of it graduated debt-free. Thus,
the authors were able to “compare the academic outcomes and career choices of otherwiseidentical students who graduated from Anon U with very different debt positions.” Id. at 151.
But see Dinovitzer, et al., supra note 88, at 71 (noting that debt levels among the first wave
of After-the-JD respondents were fairly constant across practice settings, revealing “no
simple pattern relating job choice to debt.”).

30

PAYING FOR LAW SCHOOL

[29-JAN-20]

amounts of debt and a graduate taking a higher salary position.95 The
rationale is simple: students want to pay off their student loans, especially
when they are exorbitantly high, and so they are naturally attracted to highpaying jobs. Even before graduation, law students who took internships or
summer jobs in the private sector were statistically more comfortable
accruing higher debt than those who chose to work in the public sector.96
Likewise, because public interest lawyers are the lowest paid lawyers in the
country by far, it would stand to reason that jobs in public interest law are
less appealing to students with high debt.
But the key finding from these studies is perhaps less intuitive: those who
received total debt forgiveness shifted away from higher paying jobs and
were more comfortable taking public interest positions.97 In fact, debt may be
the strongest factor that influences career choice and can largely explain the
public-interest drift. In general, students who do not have to worry about debt
are free to explore broader career paths and more seriously entertain the idea
of public interest law.98
Thus, it is undeniable that debt, salary, and risk management are the
primary factors driving law students’ post-graduate career choices.99 Yet,
some scholars have noted that the orientation of the law school curriculum or
the private-sector rhetoric pushed by top-tier law schools may play an
important part in the public-interest drift.100 The role that these social factors
95
Boutcher, et al., supra note 8, at 776 (noting that “students who desire working in the
public interest who have high debt will take higher-paying jobs in the private sector to pay
down their debt”); Rothstein & Rouse, supra note 88, at 149 (finding that “debt causes
graduate to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability that student
choose low-paid ‘public interest’ jobs’”).
96

Boutcher, et al., supra note 8, at 762-64.
“By contrast, we find negative, statistically significant effects of debt on employment
in the low salary occupations. Specifically, in our preferred specifications . . . we estimate
that an extra $10,000 in student debt reduces the likelihood that an individual will take a job
in nonprofits, government, or education by about 5 to 6 percentage points.” Id. at 174.
97

98
Id. at 179. See also, La Mort, supra note 10, at 9; and Marco DiMaggio, Ankit Kalda,
and Vincent Yao, Second Chance: Life Without Student Debt, NBER Working Paper No.
25810 3-5 (2019) (finding that loan discharge resulted in increases to borrowers’
geographical mobility, probability of changing jobs, and upward increases in their income).
99
Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School:
The Law School Experience and Students' Orientation to Public Interest Concerns, 13 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 11, 31. “It is not until students enter the job market that they need to adjust to
the realities of legal practice…the predominant concern with all students interviewed, even
those with outstanding records, was getting a job.” Id.
100
See, e.g., John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public
Interest Drift” in Law School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1973, 1975-76 (2018). However, it is
noteworthy that even proponents of the socialization drift theory recognize how debt and
salary are salient factors bearing on the career paths of law graduates. Id. at 2005. (relating
that a “drifting-path 2L explained: ‘I’m not sure I really want to work in a firm but I didn’t
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play in precipitating the phenomenon of public-interest drift should not be
discounted, but they are arguably less salient to students across all law
schools than debt, which transcends law school typology.
For law students with a desire to help people in their time of need, this
intention is demonstrably not enough to lock these students into a publicinterest career path that eventually matures into career in public interest law.
In fact, many students who are originally oriented toward a career in the
public interest struggle to reconcile their desire to help others and their
contradictory desire to earn a high salary.101 It is attractive to view the law
school socialization process as a defining factor that is partly, if not mostly,
responsible for the dismally small number of law school graduates that pursue
public interest careers; however, even pro-socialization scholarship suggests
that debt and salary are the strongest factors in determining a law student’s
post-graduate career choice and in drawing many law graduates away from
public interest law positions.102 But it is important to note that law school
graduates’ inability to repay their loans does not merely affect them but
ultimately spills over to those who benefit most from public interest work.103
C. Can the PSLF Program Solve the Problems of Student Debt, the Gap,
and the Drift?
There is no silver bullet to solve the dire problems of the student loan
crisis, the access-to-justice gap, and the public-interest drift. Yet, the Public
Sservice Loan Forgiveness program (PSLF) is the only such remedy to
mitigate the effects of all three concerns. The PSLF program makes it
possible for many, including law graduates, in traditionally low-paying
careers in the public interest to pay off their seemingly insurmountable debt,

want to close any doors, considering the crushing debt.’”). Bliss later offers the testimony of
at least two more students who cite concerns about paying off debt as a primary factor that
influenced their decision to consider high-paying private sector jobs. 2005-06; 2018-20.
101
Bliss, supra note 100, at 2003. See also Robert Granfield, Legal Education as
Corporate Ideology: Student Adjustment to the Law School Experience, 1 SOC. FORUM 514,
519 (1986). “It appears that most students enter Ivy with the desire to “help” people while
also seeking financial security and professional prestige. Very early in their careers, however,
students begin to recognize the number of opportunities for personal success in the private
sector and find it convenient to compromise their public service goals.” Id.
102

Recall that the ABA reports that only between 3 and 4 percent of law school graduates
end up in public service positions. See AM. B. ASS’N, supra note 69.
103

If fewer new attorneys are willing to take public interest jobs due to fears of
repaying their student loan debt, those who are less fortunate will suffer most. See Karp,
supra note 55; Brooks, supra note 12, at 16. “Producing lawyers is also expensive,
which in turns exacerbates the cost pressures on legal services, since lawyers may feel the
need to recoup the significant private investment.” Id.
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even though precise estimates of its efficacy at each law school accredited by
the American Bar Association are difficult to come by.104
Several scholars have noted that the value proposition of legal
education—the amount that law students pay to receive their legal education
and the payoff they can expect after graduating from law school—is not what
it once was; some have even gone so far as to say that unless a student attends
a top-tier law school and is certain to obtain a prestigious, six-figure salary
job right out of law school, the risk of attending law school is simply too
great.105 While it is an economic imperative for most graduating law students
to join the workforce upon graduation, those who graduate with large
amounts of student loan debt have more to lose if they fail to find a secure
job than those who graduate debt-free or with negligible amounts of debt.
Troublingly, some scholars have noted that there are not enough legal job
opportunities that will justify the amount of money students will spend on
law school, which makes the PSLF program essential to the accessibility of
the value proposition of legal education for all graduates.106
Forgiving student loan debt for graduates in public service careers may
indeed act as a stimulus package of sorts, allowing graduates with significant
debt—that have sacrificed in their pursuit of public service careers—to begin
basic life-making.107 Without student debt hanging over their heads, law
school graduates are free to redirect the money that would be going towards
monthly student loan payments to other areas, such as buying a car,
purchasing a home, or paying off other debts, such as credit card debt and
mortgage loan obligations.108 By removing student loan debt from the
equation, lawyers who stayed the course in public sector careers will have
more disposable income and feel more comfortable with their career
choices.109 But perhaps just as importantly, the prospect of loan forgiveness

104

See Jonathan Wolf, Why Can’t Anyone Give Us a Straight Answer About Average
Law School Student Loan Debt?, ABOVE THE LAW (July 31, 2019),
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/07/why-cant-anyone-give-us-a-straight-answer-aboutaverage-law-school-student-loan-debt/. The ABA stopped publishing data on law student
indebtedness after the 2012-2013 academic year, and other sources that estimate
indebtedness vary dramatically.
105
Crespi, supra note 73, at 145. See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS
(2019), at chapter 11.
106
Brooks, supra note 12, at 2.
107
Dina Gerdemen, Forgiving Student Loan Debt Frees Consumers To Pursue Better
Opportunities,
FORBES
(May
23,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2019/05/23/forgiving-student-loandebt-frees-consumers-to-pursue-better-opportunities/#27850fe66ba2.
108
Di Maggio, et al., supra note 98, at 3-5; La Mort, et al., supra note 10, at 9.
109
Di Maggio, et al., supra note 98; Brooks, supra note 12, at 22; Kate Sablosky
Elengold, The Investment Imperative, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) (discussing the same).
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may indeed be driving some students toward careers in public service, where
they are sorely needed.110
IV. INVESTIGATING LAW STUDENT LOAN INDEBTEDNESS
AND CAREER INTENTIONS
A. Data and Methods
In an effort to conduct research on an area heretofore unexplored across
law school typologies, I created a unique survey that queried law student
respondents in several areas related to their expected student loan debt and
careers. Chief among these areas were: the funding sources the student is
using to pay for law school; the amount of debt that the student expected on
graduation; the student’s career intentions; and the student’s intention to
participate in the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program. In the fall of
2017, I administered this survey at four law schools: a private elite law
school; a public flagship law school; a public regional law school; and a
private new law school.111 The response rate within this sample of law
students was quite robust—45 percent, 34 percent, 40 percent and 43 percent,
respectively—and respondents to the survey were representative of their law
school’s entire population on the basis of race and gender, within two percent,
in each category.112
While I was allowed to survey students at all four law schools about their
expected debt and career intentions, I was only allowed to survey students
about their intentions to enroll in the PSLF program at three law schools: the
public flagship, the public regional, and the private new law school.113
110
See Bliss, supra note 100, at 1973-76; Boutcher, et al., supra note 8, at 776; Rothstein
& Rouse, supra note 88, at 175. “Overall, it appears that . . . debt affects post-graduation
employment decisions: students with more debt are less likely to accept jobs in low-paying
industries and accept higher-paying jobs more generally. Both results are consistent with
debt aversion or the presence of credit constraints.” Id.
111
See Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Analyzing Law School Choice, 2020 ILL. L. REV. ___
(forthcoming
2020),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3309815. As a condition of their
participation in the survey, the law schools at which the survey was administered asked to
remain anonymous and only be identified by descriptive terms. The administration at the
private elite law school would not permit me to ask whether students at the law school were
planning to enroll or had already paid into the PSLF program; however, all other survey
questions were common between law schools.
112

See id.
It bears noting, again, that this survey was conducted in the Fall 2017 semester, before
reports of the dismal rate of loan forgiveness application approval were announced. As such,
it is possible that these results could be marginally lower if students were surveyed today.
113
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Responses from students at all law schools indicated that white students,
students whose parents earned more than $50,000 annually, and students who
parents earned a baccalaureate degree or higher credential were less likely
than their peers from underrepresented racial minority groups, whose parents
earned less than $50,000 annually, and whose parent or parents earned less
than a baccalaureate degree, to expect loan debts exceeding $100,000
Moreover, this same pattern holds for a student’s intention to pursue a career
in public interest law and intention to enroll or to have already paid into the
PSLF program.
Looking within the three law schools that allowed me to query their
students about their intentions to participate in the PSLF program, responses
at the public flagship law school indicated that 16 percent of white students
planned to enroll in or were already enrolled in PSLF, but 20 percent of the
African-American students and half of the Hispanic/Latino students planned
to enroll in or were already enrolled in PSLF. At the public regional law
school, nearly 29 percent of white students indicated that they planned to
enroll in or had already paid into PSLF, but half of the Hispanic/Latino
students and 70 percent of African-American students planned to enroll in or
had already paid into PSLF. At the private new law school, 33 percent of
African-American students and over 35 percent of white students surveyed
indicated that they plan to avail themselves of PSLF.114
Table 1: PSLF Intentions by Race
White

African-American

Hispanic/Latino

Public Flagship

16.00

20.00

50.00

Public Regional

28.63

70.00

50.00

Private New

35.35

33.33

N/A

Furthermore, nearly 77 percent of students at the public flagship law
school, and over 55 percent of students at the public regional and private new
law schools, with expected law school loan debt exceeding $100,000,
indicated that they plan to enroll or were enrolled in PSLF. These results
demonstrate that a significant proportion of underrepresented racial minority
students, as well as their white counterparts, and students with the greatest
expected debt loads view the PSLF as their primary recourse for repaying
114

Curiously, no Hispanic/Latino students surveyed at the new private law school
indicated that PSLF was included in their loan repayment plans but both of the AsianAmerican law students surveyed indicated that they planned to enroll or were enrolled in the
PSLF program. However, it should be noted that the private new law school is not terribly
diverse in terms of race.
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their substantial law school loan debt.
Likewise, 40 percent of the students whose parents earned a combined
income of less than $50,000 annually plan to enroll or were already enrolled
in the PSLF program at the public flagship law school. At the public regional
law school, over 21 percent of students whose parents earned less than
$50,000—but more than 44 percent of the students who parents earned less
than $60,000 annually—are counting on the PSLF program as a means to
repay their student loan debt. And over 58 percent of the students whose
parents earned less than $50,000 annually at the private new law school
indicated that they plan to use or are enrolled in the PSLF to repay their
student loans.
Additionally, over 35 percent of students who planned to enter a career in
the public sector indicated that they planned to or had already enrolled in
PSLF.115 More than 54 percent of students who sought a career in the public
sector at the public regional law school indicated that PSLF was a part of their
loan repayment plans. And over 30 percent of students at the new private law
school who plan to enter a career in the public sector reported that they plan
to repay using PSLF.
Table 2: PSLF Intentions by Debt, Parental Income, and Career Intention
Expected Debt
(>$100K)

Parental Income
(<$50K)

Career Intention
(Public Sector)

Public Flagship

76.67

40.00

35.21

Public Regional

55.55

21.70

54.09

Private New

62.80

58.82

30.36

These descriptive results are useful to confirm that the students who
arguably most need access to debt relief programs are the same students who
intend to enroll in the PSLF program. However, they fail to causally connect
a student’s endowed traits with likelihoods of debt, career intention, and
potential enrollment in the PSLF program. Thus, I analyzed the data more
closely using empirical methods, such as fixed effects and logistic regression
analysis, to interrogate the factors that most clearly and casually indicate debt
expectations, career intentions, and enrollment in the PSLF program. The
results of this analysis are outlined in the section that follows.

115

These law career sectors included: children’s law/ juvenile justice; civil liberties and
civil rights; criminal law; education law; employment/labor law; family law; general legal
services; government law; housing law; immigration law; and public interest law.
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B. Results
In conducting a closer analysis of the survey response results, I first
employed an institutional fixed effect to isolate the impact that institutional
differences may have on expectations of debt, career intentions, and
intentions to participate in the PSLF program. This fixed effect also
eliminates the bias caused by comparing law schools that produce many
graduates with significant debt or that have a public interest focus, although
no law school in my sample overtly does. Second, in employing a logistic
regression to determine likelihoods of public service careers and intentions
to participate in the PSLF program, I controlled for student debt expectations
in thousands of dollars or the percent of law school attendance funded by
federal loans, depending on the model specification, given that expectations
of debt or the percent of attendance the student was funding through federal
loan obligations could play a role in explaining both outcomes.
Additionally, I controlled for the following independent variables that
relate to these outcomes of interest in this study: race;116 sex;117 age;118
parental income;119 law school grade-point average;120 Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) score;121 annual cost of attendance;122 and risk

116
For purposes of the models that I present, race was constructed as a dichotomous
variable, where students who self-identified as belonging to an underrepresented racial
minority group in the legal education context—including African-American,
Hispanic/Latino, Native American, Asian-American/Pacific Islander—were identified
collapsed into the indicator category (or 1), while white students were coded in the
comparison category (or 0).
117
Likewise, sex was presented to students as non-binary, but in the analytic sample
(i.e., those respondents who completed the survey), respondents identified with being either
male or female, making the variable a de facto binary variable.
118

As with all control variables, age was self-reported and was coded as a continuous
integer variable.
119

Parental income was transformed from a continuous variable into a categorical
variable by increments of $50,000, to harmonize the findings reported below with the
descriptive statistics reported in the LSSSE data above.
120
In lieu of keeping grade-point averages in their standard form, given that the distance
from a 3.00 to a 4.00 is enormous in grade-point average points, this variable was represented
in terms of incremental differences of one-tenth of one grade-point average points (e.g., the
distance between 3.00 and 3.10) to more meaningfully assess the relationship of law school
performance on the dependent variable outcomes.
121

While not entirely continuous, the LSAT score variable represents the student’s selfreported LSAT score, which is scored on a scale between 120 and 180.
122
This carriable, annual cost of attendance, collapses continuous responses in
increments of $10,000, based on the student respondents estimated marginal cost of
attendance in the academic year (i.e., the amount that the student will pay with funds from
all sources to attend law school that year).
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tolerance.123 In this analysis, I used a logistic regression model, as opposed
to an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, to evaluate the
dependent variables of a student’s intentions to pursue a public service career
and to enroll in the PSLF program. I employed this modeling technique
because the likelihood of each dependent variable was bounded by 0 and 1,
yielding a truer indication of the likelihood of the dependent variable
outcomes that OLS does not provide.
For the first logistic regression analysis with an institutional fixed effect,
I regressed a student’s intention to enter public service career, which included
careers in public law that would qualify for the PSLF program,124 on the
independent variables described above and present in Table 3 below. The
results were striking, revealing that students in my analytic sample with
higher-earning parents, students with better grades, and students with higher
costs of law school attendance were less likely to want to pursue careers in
the public sector. And this may indeed be evidence of the influence of
socialization—such as family expectations and opportunity that have been
richly identified in the literature on the sociology of education—at work in
the career choices of law students.125 Specifically, the results of this analysis
indicate that as a student’s parental income increased by increments of
$50,000, that student would be 20.33 percent less likely to intend to pursue a
public interest law career. Moreover, as a student’s law school GPA increased
by 1 tenth of a GPA point (i.e., from 3.40 to 3.50), that student would be
roughly 11.93 percent less likely to intend to pursue a public sector career.
Both of these findings are statistically significant at conventional levels and
123
Risk tolerance was uniquely constructed binary variable for purposes of this study.
Students were asked three questions about their openness to tolerating risk in non-loan
scenarios that involve risk of loss. For instance, students were asked to rate on a scale of 0
to 10—with 0 being not at all comfortable and 10 being completely comfortable—how
comfortable they would be: investing in the stock market; investing in a start-up business;
gambling in a casino game (such as cards or a slot machine); and placing a bet on a sporting
event. The students’ responses were averaged first by scenario-type (i.e., investment risk
tolerance scenarios and recreational risk tolerance scenarios), and then averaged across these
two scenario types. Finally, students with an average risk tolerance index from 0 to 5 were
classified as risk averse (or 0). and students with an average risk tolerance index exceeding
5 out of a possible 10 were classified as risk neutral (or 1).
124
The types of jobs classified as public sector jobs largely overlapped with the positions
described in the ABA employment categories. See AM. B. ASS’N, supra note 69. Examples
of career choices that were categorized as public service careers include: public interest law
attorneys; governmental agency attorneys; non-governmental agency attorneys; and nonprofit legal careers.
125
There is a rich body of literature exploring social reproduction and opportunity
provided by endowed and family characteristics and how these constructs play out in
individuals’ educational outcomes. For a seminal work on the subject, see PIERRE BOURDIEU,
CULTURAL REPRODUCTION AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION (1973) (describing how educational
systems reproduce cultural and social values of students’ parents’ social class).
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were robust to multiple specifications of the model, including step-wise
specifications.126 Last, I found that as a student’s cost of attendance increased
by $10,000, that student would be more than 30.66 percent less likely to want
to pursue a public interest career at the highest statistically significant level,
evidencing the fact that many students are drawn to the private sector when
faced with greater tuition costs.127
Table 3: Public Service Career Intention
Independent Variables
Race
Sex
Age
Parents’ Income
Law School GPA
LSAT Score
Pct. of Attendance Cost Paid by Federal Loans
Cost of Attendance
Risk Tolerance
Constant
Psuedo R-squared

Odds Ratios
1.1543
(0.158)
1.6339
(0.550)
0.9639
(0.043)
0.7967**
(0.076)
0.8807**
(0.044)
1.0253
(0.0287)
1.0001
(0.000)
0.6934***
(0.088)
0.5079
(0.260)
5.6602
(24.394)
0.351

Robust Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
* (p<0.10) ** (p<0.05) *** (p<0.01)

126
In fact, the same independent variables held statistical significance (p<0.05) across
all model specifications and produced odds ratios that had both the same directionality—
positive or negative—as well as relatively similar orders of magnitude across each model
specification.
127
The results for this finding were statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Together,
the results from this model specification instill a certain confidence of reliability, given than
the R-squared values are respectable in this kind of research, with all exceeding 0.35. See
Tables 3 and 4.
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For the second and final logistic regression analysis, which also used an
institutional fixed effect, I regressed a student’s intention to participate in the
PSLF program on the same set of independent variables used in the previous
analysis, except that a student’s expected loan debt was substituted for the
percent of attendance costs paid for with federal loans. Also, because one law
school did not allow me to ask questions about a student’s intention to
participate in the PSLF program, I use data from only the three law schools
that did allow me to ask about a student’s intention to enroll in the PSLF
program. Thus, Table 4, below, reports the results from the data that I gleaned
from three of the four law schools surveyed.
Table 4: PSLF Program Participation Intention
Independent Variables
Race
Sex
Age
Parents’ Income
Law School GPA
LSAT
Expected Law School Loan Debt ($10K)
Cost of Attendance ($10K)
Risk Tolerance
Constant
Psuedo R-squared

Odds Ratios
1.9835*
(1.002)
3.0450**
(0.1675)
1.0263
(0.0540)
1.0164
(0.158)
0.8147***
(0.062)
1.0393
(0.0583)
1.2222***
(0.006)
0.6845*
(0.156)
0.5449
(0.349)
0.4637
(0.384)
0.383

Robust Standard Errors reported in parentheses.
* (p<0.10) ** (p<0.05) *** (p<0.01)

The results from this analysis are more troubling than the first analysis
and thus receive greater discussion. On average, looking within law school,
underrepresented minority students were almost twice as likely to intend to
participate in the PSLF program compared to their white peers, but this
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particular result falls just outside of normal statistical significance levels.
Additionally, women were almost 3 times more likely to intend to participate
in the PSLF program than their male peers at conventional levels of statistical
significance. Also, as a student’s law school grade-point average increased
by 1 tenth of a GPA point, that student would be 18.53 percent less likely to
intend to participate in the PSLF program at the highest statistically
significant level. Last, as a student’s expected loan indebtedness increased by
$10,000, that student would be 22.22 percent more likely to intend to
participate in PSLF, at the highest level of statistical significance.
These results offer evidence that borrowing and repaying loans to attend
law school is highly stratified on endowed factors, like race and gender, as
well as acquired factors, such as educational performance. In some ways, this
is not terribly surprising, given the overwhelming evidence of structural
stratification that occurs within legal education. Studies have indicated that,
before they even enter law school, women and underrepresented minorities
tend to perform worse on the LSAT than their white male peers, meaning that
they undermatch—or attend lower-ranked law schools—and are less likely to
be eligible for merit-based scholarships, many of which are based on LSAT
performance.128 Thus, it is understandable that these students would have the
128
In fact, while women perform, on average, better than men in their undergraduate
coursework and the same as men in law school, they tend to perform worse than men on
standardized testing, like the LSAT, which is often weighted more heavily by admissions
committees. See Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs through Law School: Toward
Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar
Passage, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 712, 732-33. The findings of my analysis, with respect
to women, also unfortunately comport with recent a recent research paper, noting that when
“women are admitted to law school, they attend schools with significantly worse placements
rates (and US News rank) than men” and that they receive scholarships in fewer numbers and
at lower amounts than their male counterparts on average. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kyle
McEntee, The Leaky Pipeline for Women Entering the Legal Profession, Research Paper
(November
2016),
https://www.lstradio.com/women/documents/MerrittAndMcEnteeResearchSummary_Nov2016.pdf. See also Taylor, supra note 4, at 496-508 (describing examples of the structural
stratification of legal education based on race, including the fact that half or less half of all
black and Latino students will receive a scholarship, while two thirds or more of Asian and
white students will be offered a scholarship). Law students are also stratified in terms of the
law schools they attend. “[Black students] were least likely to attend schools with the most
generous scholarship awards, the lowest attrition, and the best bar exam and employment
outcomes. Conversely, they were most likely to attend the least favorable school. . . . On a
whole, Black [and Latino] law students are attending law school under the riskiest terms of
. . . the four largest racial and ethnic groups . . . .” Id. at 501; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
Andrew P. Morriss, and William D. Henderson, Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal
Education, 89 IND. L. J. 941 (2014). There are gatekeeping concerns, too, about the
stratification occurring as early as a student sitting for an LSAT exam. “Seventy-two percent
of Black applicants during the 2016-17 cycle had LSAT scores below 150. This was by far
the largest proportion among the four largest racial and ethnic groups . . . and almost three
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highest student loan debt, because many of these students are borrowing loans
to pay for their law school attendance at or near the sticker price. This
significantly burdens women and minority law graduates, relative to their
male and white peers, precisely as they enter the legal profession and begin
debt repayment.
This stratification is perpetuated in terms of the career choices available
to women and underrepresented racial minority law graduates, which impact
these law graduates well after they leave the halls of law school. Although
the legal profession has diversified somewhat in recent years, over 90 percent
partners of law firms are white, and approximately 80 percent of partners in
law firms are men.129 While in law school, law students of color secure
significantly lower grades than their white peers, impacting their job
prospects after graduation.130 Because law firms often strictly limit
candidates for associate attorney positions on the basis of their grades, many
law graduates of color are precluded from the most lucrative entry-level legal
positions.131 Additionally, men and women students often leave law school

times the proportion of Asian and White applicants. . . . The majority, 55 percent, of Black
applicants within the band received no offers of admission, compared to 39 percent of
White applicants . . . These trends contradict conventional wisdom that Black applicants
with lower LSAT scores have advantages over White applicants with similar or higher
LSAT scores. The opposite is true.” Id. at 496-97.
129
See A Current Glace at Women in the Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (April 2019)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/
current_glance_2019 .pdf (citing data from NALP and the National Association of Women
Lawyers, noting that women make up just 22.7 percent of partners and just 19 percent of
equity partners in law firms); Tracy Jan, The Legal Profession Is Diversifying. But Not at
the Top, WASHINGTON POST
(November
27,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/11/27/the-legal-professionis-diversifying-but-not-at-the-top (reporting that just 9 percent of law partners were people
of color); and Bouree Lam, The Least Diverse Jobs in America, THE ATLANTIC (June 29,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/diversity-jobs-professionsamerica/396632/ (relying on 2000 census-level data to report that eight out of every ten
lawyers are white).
130
See, e.g., Clydesdale, supra note 129, at 726-32 (detailing the remarkable disparity
in law school grades between white students and students of color). Alexia Brunet Marks &
Scott A. Moss, What Makes a Law Student Succeed or Fail? A Longitudinal Study
Correlating Law School Applicant Data and Law School Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L.
STUDIES 205-65 (2016) (explaining that—even after controlling for LSAT scores,
undergraduate GPA, college quality and major, and a host of other factors—students of
color receive worse grades than white students).
131
See Clydesdale, supra note 129, at 726-32 (noting the disparity in law school grade
performance between white students and students of color); and Sarah A. Zearfoss, From
Here to Eternity with Your Law School Grades? Not So Much, MICH. L. – A2Z BLOG,
https://experience.law.umich.edu/blog/from-here-to-eternity-with-your-law-school-gradesnot-so-much/ (acknowledging that many law firms have strict GPA cutoffs for evaluating
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with different credentials. For example, studies indicate that women are more
likely than men to find mentors in their clinical work—which is often public
interest oriented—as law students.132 This could explain why women
attorneys outnumber men two-to-one in public interest law and why attorneys
of color are more common in public interest law than in private practice—
trends that have existed for at least two decades.133 Thus, because of the
structural stratification that is taking place before and during law school and
by the gate-keeping private sector employers within the legal profession,
women and underrepresented racial minorities may indeed be tracked to
public sector careers while holding the greatest debt loads from attending law
school. This reality demands further consideration, as well as action, and
speaks to the necessity of the PSLF program to mitigate the impact of this
structural stratification.
CONCLUSION
Amidst mounting student loan debt for the vast majority of law students,
an ever-increasing access-to-justice gap, and the specter of the public-interest
drift, the findings presented in this Article raise as many concerns about the
present and future stratification of the legal academic environment and the
legal profession as they do answers about the demography of law student
indebtedness and its causal relationship with the career intentions of law
entry-level candidates but arguing that law school grades matter less on the lateral attorney
market).
132
See Ruth Anne French-Hodson, The Continuing Gender Gap in Legal Education,
FED.
LAWYER,
80,
88
(July
2014),
http://www.tsulaw.edu/assets/title_IX/TheContinuingGenderGapinLegalEducation.pdf.
133

The State of Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession, INST. FOR INCLUSION IN
LEGAL
PROFESSION
16
(2017),
http://www.theiilp.com/resources/Pictures/IILP_2016_Final_LowRes.pdf (discussing the
far greater likelihood of Latinos and Native Americans to begin their legal careers in public
interest law, relative to other racial groups); Katie Dilks, Why Is No One Talking about
Gender Diversity in Public Interest Law?, NALP BULLETIN (June 2010),
https://www.nalp.org/uploads/0610_Gender_Diversity_in_Public_Interest_Law.pdf
(discussing the fact that “women outnumber men at least two to one in [public interest law
positions]—which are some of the lowest-earning fields in the legal profession”);
Employment
Patterns
–
1982-2004,
NALP
BULLETIN
(June
2006),
https://www.nalp.org/minoritieswomen (noting that “minorities are less likely to take jobs in
law firms and more likely to take jobs with public sector employers”); Minorities at Private
and
Public
Sector
Employers,
NALP
BULLETIN
(April
2003),
https://www.nalp.org/2003aprminorities “Minorities accounted for 3.71% of the more than
49,000 partners collectively reported by law firms. Among a far smaller number of public
service employers, minorities accounted for 12% of the more than 7,000 supervising
attorneys reported.” Id.
THE
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students. Principally, the results from the analyses presented above evince
that a student’s career intentions may drift away from a career in the service
of the public if the student’s parents are high wage earners, the student is
successful in law school, and the student’s cost of attendance is high. These
findings seem to support the notion that high-performing law students and
students at more selective—and therefore more expensive—law schools, are
drawn to careers in legal careers in the private sector. It may be the case that
these students seek careers in private practice precisely because they feel that
they can repay their student loans more quickly in a private sector career path.
But it could also be the case that the law school experience of these students
has socialized them to value careers in private legal practice over the
opportunity to make a career serving the public in a legal capacity. Regardless
of the individual inputs to the career choice calculus, the reality that the legal
profession may become further stratified on the basis of endowed
socioeconomic status and law school performance is alarming.
However, just as concerning is the finding that a student’s intention to
participate in the PSLF program greatly increase if the student is a woman or
underrepresented racial minority, expects greater debt loads, and performs
worse in law school. Because participation in the PSLF program is
conditional on public service employment, a student’s intention to participate
in the PSLF program can be read not only as a student’s desire to have their
considerable student loan debt forgiven but also as a proxy for their intentions
to pursue a career in public service for a decade or more. When interpreted in
that light, this result reveals the ugly truth that the legal profession is further
stratifying on the basis of race and gender.134
This troubling finding begs two questions. Why is it that women and
underrepresented racial minorities are tracking at much higher rates than their
counterparts into public service careers? And why should only clients in the
private sector be served by attorneys at the top of their law school class? The
pattern of women and underrepresented racial minorities tracking into public
sector careers has been fairly constant over time and long-predates the
creation of the PSLF program.135 Clearly, much more needs to be done from
within the legal academy and the legal profession to ensure socioeconomic,
gender, and racial diversity in the legal profession across sectors, so that
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Taylor, supra note 4, at 499-500 (discussing the stratification of legal education based
on race); and Jo Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex, Sector,
and Salary, 29 L. & SOCIETY REV. 381 (1995) (noting the stratification of the legal profession
on the basis of sex and organizational segmentation).
135
See INST. FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 134, at 16; Dilks,
supra note 134; and NALP BULLETIN, supra note 134.
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students from traditionally underrepresented backgrounds are not tracked to
a career path because of their endowed traits.136
However, in the near term, no existing program offers a more viable path
to ensuring socioeconomic, racial, and gender diversity in the legal
profession, in addition to addressing the problems of the access-to-justice gap
and the public-interest drift, than the PSLF program.137 And while the PSLF
program and its future remain the subject of political controversy, debt relief
for student loan borrowers has overwhelming public support.138 Additionally,
the incentive of loan forgiveness to offset lower pay in a career that serves a
136
For example, legal scholars have suggested that the law school curriculum could be
restructured so that all students, regardless of the practice sectors they enter upon graduation,
learn how to better serve lower-income members of the community and how to most
efficiently provide legal services at the lowest possible cost to clients. See, e.g., Perlman,
supra note 81, at 75; Mark Edwin Burge, Access to Law or Access to Lawyers? Masters
Programs in the Public Educational Mission of Law Schools, 74 U. MIAMI L. REV. 20 (2019).
Law schools can do more for lower-income Americans than require each student to complete
50 pro bono hours. Some legal academics have notably challenged law schools to tackle the
realities of poverty law and expose students to it in a more meaningful and systematic way
in order to catalyze in law students a calling to the area of public interest law. Snow, supra
note 80, at 665. “By embedding poverty law issues into core curriculum courses, professors
can begin to heighten students’ cognitive skills, sensitize students to the disparities in the
judicial system, and reinforce the responsibility and societal privilege associated with a law
degree.” Id. at 684. See also, Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal
Education and Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 535-36 (2011) (advocating for specialized
courses that focus on the justice gap and inadequate access to legal aid, although she too
finds merit in a general increased focus on justice gap rhetoric in law school.); and Lois
Johnson & Louise G. Trubek, Developing a Poverty Law Course: A Case Study, 42 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 185, 206 (1992). “There is a great need in the arena of legal
education for a course which focuses critically on poverty.” Id. Furthermore, this vision of a
restructured law school curriculum would not be limited to doctrinal learning. Although
some have argued that experiential learning might more effectively prepare law students for
the practice of law than doctrinal learning, experiential legal education does not teach law
students how to practice law efficiently. “[M]ost law schools and most clinical programs
continue to teach a predominantly bespoke model of representation, in which each client
receives highly tailored and time-consuming assistance that is necessarily expensive.”
Perlman, supra note 81, at 76. Instead, law schools should be teaching students and new
attorneys how to best utilize and work with new technologies that can cut down time and
expenses for lower-income families. This paradigm shift in the legal education curriculum
could break down the tracking barriers that the legal education may be reinforcing and
address the access-to-justice gap simultaneously.
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EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, How Public Service Loan Forgiveness Helps Close the
Justice Gap, HUFFINGTON POST (October 4, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/howpublic-service-loan-f_b_6123302. “In fact, [PSLF is] so vital that many organizations that
represent poor people are proactively educating incoming attorneys about their debt relief
options.” Id.
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A recent survey found that the majority of the public (83 percent) believes that the
government should be doing more to help students repay their student loans. For more
statistics on the matter, see Sattlemayer & Williams, supra note 50.
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crucial public need is alluring to many borrowers; the promise of student loan
debt forgiveness has already led thousands law school graduates to pursue
public service careers.139 Because women and underrepresented racial
minorities also incur the greatest debt to attend law school and are more likely
than their male and white counterparts to enter a legal career in the public
sector, the PSLF program has profound implications for alleviating the
tremendous debt loads they incur to pursue these careers.
Taken together with the public discourse surrounding the student loan
crisis and the access-to-justice gap, the results proffered in this Article
suggest that that the students who most need relief for their substantial law
school loans—students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, students
from diverse racial backgrounds, students considering careers in public law,
and students carrying the highest debt loads, most of whom are the same
students across these four categories—are the students most likely to enroll
in the PSLF program. Thus, the PSLF program is the best available option to
ensure diversity in the legal profession, in terms of socioeconomic status,
gender, and race. But the PSLF program also has substantial implications for
ensuring access to justice. The PSLF program provides an important pathway
for lawyers willing to serve in public service roles, often at dramatically
lower salaries than their peers who pursue careers in the private sector, to
repay their loans, while helping to address the unmet demand for legal
services for those with the greatest need in our society.140 To eliminate the
PSLF program, and these important goals that it accomplishes, would be a
mistake.
***
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Di Maggio, et al., supra note 98, at 3-5.
For example, it is estimated that legal aid lawyers “are estimated to provide just 1
percent of the total legal needs in the United States each year[.]” Three Ways to Meet the
“Staggering” Amount to Unmet Legal Needs, AM. B. ASS’N J., June 26, 2018,
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/july-2018/3-waysto-meet-the-staggering-amount-of-unmet-legal-needs-/.
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